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Social Identification Predicts Desires and Expectations for Voice

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Abstract Although a large body of empirical and theoretical work in procedural justice points to the positive consequences of providing voice to people, it remains unclear whether, and to what degree, people may desire voice in the first instance. The current paper presents two studies in which we directly measure people's relative levels of voice desires and expectations. We hypothesized that any variability in these outcomes would be predicted, at least in part, by people's relative levels of social identification with salient voice-relevant in-groups. We confirmed this hypothesis in one correlational study with pre-existing groups (Australia and participants' workplaces) and one study with experimentally created, minimal groups. Results revealed that people do desire and expect voice, but these are neither necessarily extreme nor uniform. Moreover, consistent with our hypothesis, variability in these desires and expectations was associated in a systematic manner with the relative levels of social identification related to a salient in-group that is *relevant* to the voice context. We consider the implications of these findings with regard to theories of procedural justice, as well as critical directions for future empirical and theoretical work.

Keywords Procedural justice · Voice · Social identification · Group membership

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Introduction

Allowing people to have a say (i.e. providing them with "voice"; e.g. Folger, 1977) in matters relevant to them is recognized within the social–psychological literature as an interpersonal and group-based process that produces a variety of positive individual and collective outcomes. Being given voice, for example, not only yields a subjective confirmation of a just process (i.e. people see it as fair; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990), but also yields enhanced personal self-esteem (Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993), feelings of respect (Platow, Brewer, & Eggins, 2008), collective contributions (Platow, Filardo, Troselj, Grace, & Ryan, 2005), and social identification with the relevant group (Lipponen, Olkkonen, & Moilanen, 2004). The robust nature of these outcomes attests persuasively to the positive power of voice provision. At the same time, however, we fear that there may be a tendency to assume, on the basis of this literature, that voice is always desired and, even, expected—precisely because of these known positive outcomes. Although this a reasonable assumption, it remains untested, primarily because researchers have traditionally focused on voice provision as an independent variable, and not typically measured voice desire or expectation in the first instance (see Brockner & Carter, 2014).

The strength of the positive consequences of voice provision seems to be so great as to suggest no need to evaluate an assumption of voice desires. However, other analyses inform us that variability does exist in judgments of the *value* of voice per se (Avery & Quiñones, 2004; Bauman & Skitka, 2009) and that some people fail to voice their opinions when given the opportunity (e.g. Knoll & van Dick, 2013). A classic, large-scale example of this latter observation is the often observed low voter turnout in countries in which voting is voluntary; although undoubtedly multiply determined (e.g. Harder & Krosnick, 2008; Powell Jr., 1986), it nevertheless presents an instance in which, at a minimum, the presumed strong desire for voice fails to manifest itself. Indeed, a variety of factors that are likely to predict variability in voice desire can be identified in the existing literature, including personality (Avery, 2003), internalized ideologies (e.g. Altemeyer, 1996), and fundamental instrumental concerns (Barry & Shapiro, 2000).

In current paper, we directly measure potential variability in voice desires and expectations and examine the degree to which any such variability is predicted, at least in part, by people's *relative social identification* (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986) with the group associated with the voice content (i.e. the topic about which people are actually speaking). Ultimately, we test a hypothesis that relative levels of social identification will positively predict—and, in fact, cause—identity-relevant voice desires and expectations. Below, we review various domains of theory and research that collectively allow us to derive this hypothesis. We start by first considering contemporary models of the social psychology of procedural justice and voice that explicitly identify the importance of social identification processes.

The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice and Voice

Conceptually, voice is important to people on matters *relevant* to them. The relevance can be founded in personal and collective concerns of both a material and symbolic nature. Materially, the instrumental nature of voice can help people achieve valued outcomes for themselves (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) and their group (Peate, Platow, & Eggins, 2008). Symbolically, voice provides people with confirmation of their status as valued group members in good standing (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994, 1997). In either case, the provision of voice leads to specific desired outcomes, outcomes that are often afforded to people in the context of their group memberships, as outlined explicitly in the group value model (GVM) and the group engagement model (GEM; Tyler & Blader, 2003).

The GVM and GEM play a particularly strong role in our current thinking and experimental design as they outline processes underlying the social psychology of procedural justice judgements and reactions *beyond personal self-interest*. The important contribution of these models was to extend the early work on the psychology of procedural justice (e.g. Thibaut & Walker, 1975) beyond the confines of material resource attainment and control. In doing so, they identified the role of social-identity-based processes in affecting these judgements and reactions. The GEM, in particular, proposes that authorities' treatment of others in a procedurally fair manner (e.g. through voice provision) enhances these others' levels of social identification with the relevant group (Tyler & Blader, 2003). Moreover, this voice-leads-to-social-identification path is proposed to be mediated by the enhanced sense of respect people gain from being treated fairly, as well as the pride in their group that people gain from knowledge of its enactment of fair procedures. The path is, thus, that an authority's voice provision leads to pride and respect which, in turn, lead to enhanced social identification.

The question we are currently asking effectively changes the causal order outlined in this model. Thus, in addition to social identification being an outcome of voice provision, we ask whether social identification can be an input and lead people to desire and expect voice in the first place. This is not an unreasonable question, as we already know that people do not *only* walk into groups with opinions, attitudes, and even desires in hand; rather, the groups themselves structure, guide, and even create these opinions, attitudes, and desires (Ellemers, de Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Powel, & Turner, 2000; Sherif & Cantril, 1947). Again, this is precisely process we currently examine: that desires for voice can, themselves, be an outcome of psychological group memberships (cf., Platow, Hunter, Haslam, & Reicher, 2015) and that the more important groups are to people, the more relevant the voice issues *specifically related to these groups* will be to people (cf., Blanz, 1999).

Of course, the importance of group memberships to people can be understood, at least in part, as a component of people's social identification with these groups. Empirically, there are at least four independent lines of research on social identification and either actual voice usage or voice-provision consequences that give us confidence in proposing a relationship between relative levels of social identification and voice desires and expectations. We discuss each of these in turn.

Group Belongingness and Relational Models of Procedural Justice

The first line of research that is relevant derives from assumptions of relational models of procedural justice, including the GVM (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the GEM (Tyler & Blader, 2003). As noted above, voice provision within these models is valued, at least in part, because of its social-identity-informing properties: being given a voice opportunity confirms one's group membership in good standing. This assumption has led some authors to consider whether previously found positive consequences of voice provision would emerge most strongly among those group members whose in-group status and social identification were relatively secure (i.e. among those who were confidently group members). For example, van Prooijen, van den Bos, and Wilke (2004) observed in two studies that voice provision enhanced satisfaction among group members with relatively secure in-group status. Subsequent research by Mayer, Greenbaum, Kuenzi, and Shteynberg (2009) observed that high versus low voice provision yielded greater differences in procedural fairness perceptions among group members whose social identity was *not* under threat compared to those whose social identity was under threat. The results of these studies are consistent with a proposition that voice processes are strongest among people more closely associated with and, potentially, more (rather than less) highly identified with their group.

Actual Voice in Intragroup Dissent

In a separate line of enquiry on dissent within groups, relative levels of social identification have been shown to be directly related actual voice usage. For example, Packer (2009) observed that highly identified students were more likely to express group-related concerns about fellow in-group members' (i.e. fellow students') behaviours regardless of whether they believed the others would disagree with them; lower identifiers were only willing to express this concern if they believed the others would not disagree with them. Packer and Chasteen (2010) followed this up with a series of studies, one of which measured actual voicing behaviour. Here, it was higher identifiers, but not lower identifiers, who were likely to express a dissenting but group-promoting view in an online chat-room. In an independent line of research, Crane and Platow (2010) observed in their first study a positive relationship between perceived intragroup, injunctive norm violation (by others) and own previous voicing of group-promoting dissent among higher identified group members but not lower identified group members. In their second study, not only were there more highly identified group members actually voicing discontent than lower identified group members overall, but this was particularly so when there was an injunctive norm violation. Collectively, these studies demonstrate how the group relevance (in this case, related to norm violations) of the voice content leads higher identifiers to be particularly likely actually to voice their opinions; this does not hold true for lower identifiers.

Responding to Voice in Intragroup Dissent

The relationship between social identification and voice, at least in the context of intragroup dissent, makes even more sense when we consider how dissenters are actually perceived by their fellow in-group members. Work by Horsney, Trembath, and Gunthorpe (2004), for example, showed that dissenters described as relatively highly identified with their in-group were seen as more constructive than those described as having relatively low levels of in-group social identification. Moreover, this perceived constructiveness translated into less negative evaluations of the dissenters themselves. Hornsey, Grice, Jetten, Paulsen, and Callan (2007) followed up this work with three further studies demonstrating a negative relationship between dissenters' perceived social identification with their group and the relatively negative evaluations they received in response to the dissention. Finally, Tarrant and Campbell (2007) showed that in-group dissenters who had previously been engaged in in-group normative behaviours were evaluated relatively favourably. Critically, however, this effect was mediated by the degree of perceived in-group social identification of the dissenter. Together, these findings suggest actual voice behaviour in the form of in-group dissent may hold less of a social risk for relatively highly identified group members compared to those with lower levels of social identification. This may well translate into higher identifiers actually having a desire to take up available voice opportunities.

Actual Voice in Intergroup Dissent

Finally, there is a body of research demonstrating that high identifiers, more so than low identifiers, are the ones who engage in active voice behaviour in intergroup contexts. For example, Simon et al. (1998) demonstrated that social identification with a collective movement (either "Gray Panthers" or the gay movement) was strongly and positively associated with willingness to participate in collective action—a type of "social change voice" (see Platow et al., 2013, p. 361)—even after controlling for previous levels of participation and individual reward motives. And Kelly and Kelly (1994) observed a similar pattern among union members. Overall, a recent meta-analysis confirmed the positive relationship between social identification and some form of social change voice (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

The Current Research

Currently, we present two studies in which we predicted participants' desires and expectations for voice from their levels of social identification with a relevant group. Whereas Study 1 was completely correlational, in Study 2 we experimentally manipulated relative levels of social identification. In each study, we measured both desires and expectations. Although these latter two concepts are not isomorphic with each other (e.g. McDaniel, 1970), we had no basis for conceptually differentiating them in the currently employed paradigms, and so we made no separate predictions (and, as will be seen, there were, in fact, no empirical

differences). Therefore, our hypothesis, as stated above, was simply that *relative levels of social identification will positively predict—and, in fact, cause—identity-relevant voice desires and expectations*.

Study 1

In this study, we measured participants' national social identification (in this case, with the country Australia) and their workplace social identification and predicted political and workplace voice desires and expectations (respectively).

Method

Participants

Fifty-nine male and 127 female university students (median age = 19) voluntarily participated in this study as part of a class requirement. All were Australian citizens, and all indicated that they were engaged in some form of employment (part-time work, full-time work) at the time of participation.

Procedure and Materials

The entire study was conducted online, with participants either directly coming into the laboratory or completing the study at their own chosen location. There were several sections to the study, completed in the order presented below.[1]

Social Context of Voice and Social Identification The first two sections (counter-balanced between participants) each presented a specific voice context, the measures of relevant social identification, and voice desire and expectation questions. One context was of Australian national identity, and one was of the workplace. In the former, participants were asked to think about how they generally behave "in relation to political issues in Australia, such as your past voting patterns or involvement in political activities", and were instructed to "answer the following questions about your feelings and perceptions about being a member of the Australian public". In the latter, they were asked to think about how they generally behave "in a work setting, such as interactions with members of your work team or your boss, how you tend to act, think, or feel when you are with them", and were instructed to "answer the following questions regarding your perceptions and feelings about your place of employment".

[1] Prior to the answering the questions below, participants first responded to a series of questions measuring power distance ideology (Brockner et al., 2001; Clugston, Howell, & Dorfman, 2000) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010). Neither of these ideologies entered into any main or interaction effects on voice desires and expectations. As the results we present below were not qualified in any manner by these, we do not report these ideologies any further.

In each of the two sections, participants first responded to seven social identification items. Five of these items were taken from Mael and Ashforth (1992: "When someone criticizes [Australia/my workplace] it feels like a personal insult", "I am interested in what others think about [Australia/my workplace]", "When I talk about [Australia/my workplace], I usually say "we" rather than "they", "[Australia's/My workplace's] successes are my successes", and "When someone praises [Australia/my workplace], it feels like a personal compliment". The remaining two social identification items were taken from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995: "I am pleased to be [Australian/a member of my workplace]" and "I feel strong ties to [Australia/my workplace]"). All responses to these and the items below (other than demographic questions) were made on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 7 ("strongly agree").

Participants then responded to the following four voice desire and voice expectation items: "Generally speaking, I have a desire to voice my opinions on [political issues that concern me in Australia/issues that concern me at work]", "Generally speaking, I would like to have a say in [political matters that concern me in Australia/matters that concern me within a work context]", "Within a [political/work] context, I usually expect to have a say on matters which concern me" and "Before decisions are made on [political issues in Australia/issues at work], I expect to be asked my opinion on the matter".

Demographics The final section measured participants' age and gender, and work and citizenship status.

Upon completion, all participants were fully debriefed.

Results

Scale Construction and Properties

Because we sought to predict voice desires and expectations from relevant social identification, it was important for us first to demonstrate that our scales measuring these separate constructs did not, empirically, load together as a single construct. We, thus, conducted principal components analyses with Oblimin rotation within

Table 1 Study 1 Cronbach's alphas, scale means, standard errors of the mean, and correlations

Scale	α	Mean	Standard errors of the mean	Scale		
				2	3	4
1. Australian social identification	.90	4.88	.08	.35**	.21**	.14
2. Work social identification	.88	4.61	.08		.18*	.43**
3. Political voice desire and expectation	.83	4.19	.08			.28**
4. Work voice desire and expectation	.82	4.60	.09			

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

each context condition on the four voice desire and expectation items and seven corresponding social identification items. Each of these analyses yielded two separate components corresponding to: (1) social identification and (2) voice desires and expectations together (i.e. these latter items did not form two separate components). As a result, a mean of all items within each component was calculated for each participant, forming four separate scales.

Cronbach's alphas, means, standard errors of the mean, and pair-wise correlations of the scales are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, average social identification with Australia and participants' workplace was relatively high, with both being significantly greater than the scale mid-point [$t(185) = 10.57$, $p < .001$; $t(185) = 7.55$, $p < .001$, respectively]. Voice expectations and desires in both the political realm [$t(185) = 2.00$, $p < .05$] and the workplace [$t(185) = 7.45$, $p < .001$] were also both significantly greater than the scale mid-point (despite the small magnitude of the former). In terms of the correlations, significant positive correlations were observed between Australian and workplace social identification, and political and work voice desires and expectations. A larger correlation was observed between voice desires and expectations and the context-relevant social identification than the context non-relevant social identification.

Predicting Voice Desires and Expectations

We examined potential predictors of voice desires and expectations by conducting separate regression analyses for each social context. Because our above correlational analyses indicated that the two forms of voice desires and expectations were significantly correlated with each other, as were the two forms social identification, we strove to control for this known shared variance in our regressions. We therefore conducted step-wise regressions in which the context-irrelevant social identification and voice desires and expectations in the alternative context were entered into Step 1, with the context-relevant social identification entered into Step 2.

Within the political context, the model tested in Step 1 was statistically significant [$F(2,183) = 8.38$, $p < .001$, adjusted $R^2 = .07$]. Workplace voice desires and expectations significantly predicted political voice desires and expectations, $\beta = .25$, $p < .01$; the more participants desired and expected voice in one context, the more they desired and expected it in another context. In contrast, however, the context-irrelevant workplace social identification did *not* statistically significantly predict political voice desires and expectations, $\beta = .07$, $p = .38$. Critically, adding context-relevant political social identification in Step 2 improved the model [$\Delta F(1,182) = 5.13$, $p < .05$, Step 2 adjusted $R^2 = .09$]. Political social identification significantly predicted political voice desires and expectations, $\beta = .17$, $p < .01$. Workplace voice desires and expectations remained significant ($\beta = .26$, $p < .01$), while workplace social identification remained non-significant ($\beta = .01$, $p = .92$).

Within the workplace context, the model tested in Step 1 was also statistically significant [$F(2,183) = 8.64$, $p < .001$, adjusted $R^2 = .08$]. Essentially replicating the effect reported above, political voice desires and expectations significantly predicted workplace voice desires and expectations, $\beta = .27$, $p < .001$. In contrast,

and similar to the above findings, the context-irrelevant political social identification did *not* statistically significantly predict workplace voice desires and expectations, $\beta = .08$, $p = .26$. Once again, however, adding context-relevant workplace social identification in Step 2 improved the model [$\Delta F(1,182) = 35.22$, $p < .001$, Step 2 adjusted $R^2 = .22$]. As expected, workplace social identification significantly predicted workplace voice desires and expectations, $\beta = .17$, $p < .01$. Political voice desires and expectations remained significant ($\beta = .22$, $p < .01$), while political social identification remained non-significant ($\beta = -.05$, $p = .44$).

Discussion of Study 1

This study examined our hypothesis that voice desires and expectations would positively vary with relative levels of relevant social identification. Clear and confirming support for this hypothesis was observed. Not only did people vary in their relative desires and expectations for voice, but that variability was meaningfully accounted by a known, and well-understood, social–psychological variable (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Having noted this, however, we also do not want to over-state the responses we observed: mean levels of voice desires and expectations were still relatively high and, in fact, statistically significantly greater than indifference. So, as might be expected from a broad reading of the extant literature, voice remained a clearly valued process among our participants. And yet, participants' mean desires and expectations were not extreme, especially in the political context. Indeed, these latter responses are particularly interesting in the light of Australia's legal mandate *requiring* all citizens to vote in all elections (yielding voter turn-out rates over 90 %). Such a law might reasonably lead us to predict that voice expectations, at least, would be extremely high. Obviously, our questions were not framed in terms of formal voting, so we cannot claim this is precisely what we were measuring. But it still remains a factor that might have otherwise enhanced the responses we observed. So, what we know is that people do desire and expect voice, not to an extreme degree and not in a uniform manner, but in a systematic manner associated with the relative levels of voice-relevant social identification.

We note as well that reported voice desires and expectations did, in fact, load on a single component. In the currently examined domains, participants were clearly not responding to the items measuring these attitudes in different manners. Here, we simply recognize that a similar pattern may not always occur, and the two may well be subject to different social and psychological processes. As noted above, however, our goal in the current paper is specifically to examine the processes associated with relative levels of social identification, which we pursued further in an experimental context in Study 2.

Study 2

In Study 2, we continued our examination of our hypothesis, this time attempting to manipulate experimentally participants' levels of social identification. To do so, we based our experimental procedures on the assumptions of the GEM (Tyler & Blader,

2003). As we outlined in the general Introduction, this model of procedural fairness specifically predicts that group members' relative pride in, and respect from, their group will enhance their levels of social identification with that group. Although the GEM also assumes that pride and respect derive from procedurally fair treatment, we "flipped" the model around by independently manipulating pride and respect levels through other means (described below), and then measuring desires and expectations for voice, treating social identification as the key mediator. In this manner, we evaluated a model in which specific experimental manipulations of pride and respect would lead to subjective experiences of pride and respect which would, in turn, lead to enhanced social identification that would then lead directly to enhanced desires and expectations for voice. If we are able to confirm this model in Study 2, then we will be able to move beyond our conclusions in Study 1 by being able to make explicit *causal* inferences between relative levels of social identification, and voice desires and expectations. We had no explicit predictions regarding any interactive effects of our pride and respect manipulations, as the GEM treats these both independently; nevertheless, we examined potential interactions for completeness.

Because we had the goal of manipulating social identification, we explicitly chose a group membership with which participants were likely *not* to have any a priori identification (so that we could be confident that our manipulations would have some reasonable likelihood of success). To that end, we created minimal groups through supposed painter-preference procedures that we (e.g. Platow, Grace, & Smithson, 2012; Platow, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990) and others (e.g. Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) have successfully employed in the past. Through these manipulations, and others described below, we were then able to maintain face validity by presenting the experimental context to participants as one on creativity in groups. This framing further allowed us to include an additional, social identification-relevant voice-topic manipulation as a within-participants independent variable, again allowing us to examine this key aspect of our hypothesis. We did this in Study 2 by measuring participants' voice desires and expectations in a group creativity (i.e. social-identity relevant) context and a public health initiative (i.e. social-identity irrelevant) context. Consistent with our general hypothesis, we expected support for our proposed model more strongly, if not solely, in the former than the latter context.

Method

Participants and Design

One hundred fifty-one (36 males, 112 females, 3 unspecified) individuals participated in the current study (median age = 20). Participants were recruited through various online social media outlets (e.g. Facebook), as well as posters displayed across the campus of the Australian National University. There was no monetary reimbursement, although first-year psychology students received credit towards a class requirement. The current study employed a 2 (intergroup pride: high/low) × 2 (intragroup respect: high/low) × 2 (voice-topic relevance: relevant/

irrelevant) mixed factorial design; pride and respect were between-participants variables, and voice relevance was a within-participants variable. Each individual was randomly assigned to one of the four between-participants conditions.

Procedure and Materials

In designing this study, we were cognizant of the fact that there are no standard experimental paradigms for manipulating relative levels of social identification. Most studies that report social identification manipulations actually are manipulating the relative *salience* of a social identity rather than the *level* of social identification (e.g. van Vugt & de Cremer, 1999). The few studies that have manipulated levels of social identification have employed complex procedures such as a bogus-pipeline (e.g. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) or face-to-face interactions (e.g. Kane, Argote, & Levine, 2005). This presented us with a particular challenge, especially since we sought to employ minimal groups. The procedure we outline below was, thus, a novel attempt a social identification manipulation. Because our current work is grounded in the procedural justice literature, we took our lead from the GEM and manipulated social identification through group-based pride and respect. The procedure, thus, entailed creating a context for groups to exist, a basis for pride and respect to be derived, and a reasonable rationale for the potential provision of voice. Despite its complexity, however, we are testing the identical model that we did in Study 1, that social identification positively predicts relevant voice desires and expectations.

The entire study was conducted online, with participants completing the study at their own chosen location. The study was described as one investigating people's engagement with creativity tasks in groups. All participants were then led to believe that they were engaging in an online task with seven other participants; in reality, no actual interaction took place and all responses were recorded individually. In the first part of the study, participants completed false painter-preference task to enable the creation of minimal groups (Tajfel et al., 1971). After indicating the preferences among ten pairs of paintings by Klee and Kandinsky, they were all individually informed that they were in the Kandinsky-liking group. Participants were also led to believe that, of the other (fictional) participants with whom they were interacting, three others were also in the Kandinsky group (i.e. fellow in-group members) while the remaining four were in the Klee group (i.e. out-group members).

After the minimal group manipulation, participants completed a supposed group creativity task, which served as the basis for *both* the intragroup respect and the intergroup pride manipulations. In this creativity task, participants were told that each group had the task of generating 20 potential uses for a brick. Because there were four people in each group, each individual participant was asked to generate five uses, typing his or her ideas into open response fields on the computer. Once participants had generated and submitted their five ideas, they were able to continue to the next screen on which all 20 of their own group's (i.e. the Kandinsky group's) ideas were displayed. Apart from the five ideas submitted by each individual participant, the 15 other ideas on display were generated a priori by the

experimenter (e.g. "doorstop", "an exercise weight", "herb and spices crusher") and were constant for each participant.

Manipulation of Intragroup Respect Upon reading the other ideas, participants were then given the opportunity to send a comment to each of the other supposed members in their in-group based on how they (i.e. the actual participants *and* the supposed other in-group members) thought each of the others had done on the creativity task. This served as the premise upon which participants received feedback from their in-group members about their own task performance as the manipulation of intragroup respect. To standardize the feedback that participants received, the options for comments on task performance were restricted to selections from a dropdown menu, with nine available options ranging from very positive ("I thought your ideas were the best!") to very negative ("I thought your ideas were the worst!"). Participants in the *high intragroup respect* condition received three relatively positive comments about their performance from their in-group members ("I thought your ideas were excellent!" "I thought your ideas were good", and "I thought your ideas were okay".). Participants in the *low intragroup respect* condition, on the other hand, received three relatively negative comments about their performance from their in-group members ("I thought your ideas weren't that good", "I thought your ideas were bad", and "I thought your ideas were okay".).

Manipulation of Intergroup Pride The manipulation of intergroup pride always followed that of intragroup respect. In introducing the manipulation, all participants were informed that "our system has been able to calculate your overall group score on the creativity task". Participants in the *high intergroup pride* condition were told that:

> The Kandinsky group generated more ideas than the Klee group. This indicates that YOUR group is more creative than the other group. Based on data already collected from this survey, we expect to find novel and interesting results from your group!

The same text was used in the *low intergroup pride* condition except that the in-group was described as having generated "fewer ideas" than the out-group, was "less creative" than the out-group, and that the experiments did *not* expect to find novel and interesting results from their in-group.

Measurement of Perceived Respect and Perceived Pride Following the intergroup pride manipulation, participants responded to four items measuring perceived respect and three items measuring perceived pride. The perceived respect items were: (1) "Overall, did your group members send encouraging or discouraging comments to you?" (1 = "very discouraging", 7 = "very encouraging"), (2) "Did these comments make you feel respected by your fellow Kandinsky group members?" (1 = "very disrespected", 7 = "very respected"), (3) "I believe that most members of the Kandinsky group respect me" (1 = "strongly disagree",

7 = "strongly agree"), and (4) "I believe I made a good impression on the other members of the Kandinsky group" (1 = "strongly disagree", 7 = "strongly agree"). The perceived pride items were: (1) "Did the results of the group analysis make you feel proud to be in the Kandinsky group?" (1 = "very ashamed", "7 = "very proud"), (2) "Based on the results of the group creativity task, I am proud to think of myself as a member of the Kandinsky group" (1 = "strongly disagree", 7 = "strongly agree"), and (3) "Overall, the Kandinsky group is considered good by other online participants" (1 = "strongly disagree", 7 = "strongly agree").

Voice Context and Relevance We next created a context within which participants could legitimately be asked of their desires for, and expectations of, voice from a social-identity-relevant authority. To do this, participants were told that we were interested in people's attitudes on two different issues, although each individual participant would have a chance to voice his or her views on one issue only. We then announced that a leader would be chosen randomly from among the current eight online participants and that this leader would decide on which issue each participant would be given voice (see Platow, Reid, & Andrew, 1998, for a similar procedure). The supposed leader was said to have access to the ideas generated by each participant on the creativity task, as well as the overall performance for each group, as a means of facilitating his or her decision-making. This latter information was included to make salient to the participants that the leader was aware of the performance of each participant and each group. In all instances, the supposedly randomly chosen leader was *never* the actual participants, but was *always* described as being a fellow in-group (i.e. Kandinsky) member. The experimental purpose of including a supposed leader to distribute voice issues was to provide a basis of uncertainty to allow us to ask participants the degree to which they wanted and expected voice *prior to actually having voice*.

The presence of two different voice issues served as the basis of the manipulation of *voice relevance*. The relevant topic was described as "Encouraging creativity in group-based situations (workplaces, schools, and universities);" it was specifically related to the concept of creativity, around which group membership, as well as the pride and respect manipulations were formulated. In contrast, the irrelevant topic was completely unrelated to the tasks participants had been completing thus far; it was described as "Public health initiatives".

Measurement of Voice Desires and Expectations While the supposed leader was making his or her decisions, participants were presented with voice desires and expectations questions for each of the two different issues. Two basic items measured voice desires for each issue: (1) "I would like to have a say on [encouraging creativity in groups/public health initiatives]" and (2) "I would want to have a say on [encouraging creativity in groups/public health initiatives]". Two further basic items measured voice expectations for each issue: (1) "I expect to be given a say on [encouraging creativity in groups/public health initiatives]" and (2) "I anticipate having a say on [encouraging creativity in groups/public health

initiatives]". In addition to the different structures of these items as a function of the voice issue, we further varied each one to make salient participants' own performance and their in-group's performance. To achieve this, we presented the items once with the preface "Considering how I personally performed on the Group Creativity Task", and once with the preface "Considering how my group performed on the Group Creativity Task". We included these latter question-framing differences for exploratory purposes because our experimental manipulations independently varied personal and group performance; in designing our items, we were uncertain whether our manipulations would uniquely impact upon items that made salient the feedback provided by those manipulations. In total, there were, thus, eight items presented for each issue. For all participants, all issue-related items were presented together in a single block; however, within each block, the eight items were randomly ordered for each participant, and the two issue blocks were counter-balanced between participants. All responses were made on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 10 ("strongly agree").

Measurement of Social Identification In the next part of the experiment, all participants responded to ten items measuring their social identification with their minimal in-group. We intentionally chose different items in Study 2 than the ones used in Study 1 because the nature of the groups employed differed considerably. For example, we expected that it would not make much sense to participants if we asked them to respond to the item, "When I talk about the Kandinsky group, I usually say "we" rather than "they"" (because these are laboratory-created groups, and participants had had no previous opportunity to say these things). Instead, we used four modified items from Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) membership subscale of their collective self-esteem scale [e.g. "I am a cooperative participant of the Kandinsky group", "I feel I am a useless member of the Kandinsky group" (R)] and four modified items from their private subscale [e.g. "I feel good about belonging to the Kandinsky group", "I regret that I belong to the Kandinsky group" (R)]. We also used a modified version of Postmes, Haslam, and Jans' (2013) single-item measure of social identification, "I identify as a member of the Kandinsky group". Finally, in the light of the relatively negative feedback that people in the low respect and low pride conditions received, we added a tenth item modified from Cameron (2004), which was simply, "I don't feel good about being a Kandinsky group member". All items were presented in a single order, and all participants' responses were made on the same 10-point Likert-type scale as above. We recognize that social identification as a psychological process in the model we are proposing precedes voice desires and expectations, yet we currently measured it after measuring voice desires and expectations. We intentionally chose the current order because we did not want the social identification items themselves to serve as, effectively, a separate manipulation of self-category salience, thereby potentially *homogenizing* relevant voice desires and expectations (i.e. inadvertently reducing the variance; cf., Hogg & Turner, 1987). We further consider the causal ordering of these variables in our "Results" section.

Demographics In the final section, demographic questions (i.e. age, sex) were presented.

Upon completion, all participants received a full explanation of the procedure, including the nature of the deception.

Results

Scale Construction and Properties

Because the four perceived respect and three perceived pride items were developed anew for this study, we first conducted a principal components analysis with Oblimin rotation on all seven items. Two components with eigenvalues greater than one emerged, each corresponding to the conceptual variable. As such, an average score was calculated for each participant for the perceived respect items ($\alpha = .95$) and the perceived pride items ($\alpha = .90$). We next conducted a second principal components analysis on the 16 voice desires and expectations items. Four components with eigenvalues greater than one emerged. These components corresponded to the four relevant voice desires items ($\alpha = .93$), the four irrelevant voice desires items ($\alpha = .97$), the four relevant voice expectations items ($\alpha = .94$), and the four irrelevant voice expectations items ($\alpha = .95$). The personal vs. group performance framing was, thus, not sufficiently strong to yield its own components. As such, a mean of the four items in the above four components was calculated for each participant. Clearly, unlike Study 1, participants in Study 2 *did* differentiate between voice desires and expectations. Finally, the ten social identification items

Table 2 Study 2 scale grand means, standard errors of the mean, and correlations

Scale	Mean	Standard errors of the mean	Scale					
			2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Perceived respect	3.99[a]	.13	.47**	.05	−.02	.17*	−.02	.48**
2. Perceived pride	4.09[a]	.10		.14	−.09	.32**	−.10	.56**
3. Relevant voice desires	6.41[a]	.14			.19*	.62**	.31**	.28**
4. Irrelevant voice desires	5.49[b]	.17				.23**	.69**	.04
5. Relevant voice expectations	5.12[b]	.16					.33**	.33**
6. Irrelevant voice expectations	4.94[b]	.16						−.03
7. Social identification	6.55[a]	.13						

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

[a] Measured on a 7-point scale

[b] <easured on a 10-point scale

derived from previously established scales had a good internal reliability ($\alpha = .85$); again, an average of them was calculated for each participant.

Table 2 presents the grand means, standard errors of the mean, and pair-wise correlations of the scales. As can be seen, across experimental conditions, neither perceived pride nor perceived respect statistically differed from the response-scale mid-point of 4; this is not surprising, as these values included participants in both high and low pride/respect conditions. Of the four voice desires and expectation scales, the only instance in which participants' responses were statistically significantly *greater* than indifference (i.e. the imputed scale mid-point of 5.5) was in the context of relevant voice desires [$t(150) = 6.50$, $p < .001$]. Mean irrelevant voice desires did not differ from indifference; while both relevant voice expectations [$t(150) = -2.38$, $p < .01$] and irrelevant voice expectations [$t(150) = -3.50$, $p < .001$] were statistically significantly *lower* than indifference. Finally, despite including participants from both high and low pride/respect conditions, the overall mean level of social identification with participants' minimal group was statistically significantly greater than indifference [$t(150) = 8.08$, $p < .001$].

As can also be seen in Table 2, social identification was positively correlated with relevant, but not irrelevant, voice desires and expectations. Social identification was also positively correlated with both perceived intragroup respect and intergroup pride, as expected from the GEM (Tyler & Blader, 2003). Perceived respect and perceived pride were also positively correlated with each other. Finally, although there were various correlations among the four voice desires and expectations scales, what is notable is that the largest positive correlations are between relevant voice desires and relevant voice expectations, and irrelevant voice desires and irrelevant voice expectations.

Hypothesis Testing: Path Modelling

Recall that our conceptual model was one in which manipulated intragroup respect and intergroup pride would affect perceived respect and pride which would, in turn, predict levels of social identification which would, finally, predict relevant voice desires and expectations. To examine this, we first effect coded our experimental manipulations of respect and pride, and calculated an interaction term between these two as well. We then constructed a model using SPSS AMOS 22.0 in which these two main effect and interaction were each allowed to predict directly perceived respect and perceived pride. Perceived respect and pride were then allowed to predict social identification and responses to all four voice desires and expectations scales. Finally, social identification was also allowed to predict directly responses to the four voice desires and expectations scales. We included correlated error terms for perceived respect and pride, and among the four voice desires and expectations scales. This model provided a good fit of the data, $\chi^2(15) = 13.53$, $p = .56$; GFI = .983; AGFI = .937; RMSEA = .000; PCLOSE = .840. Figure 1 presents the *significant* paths in the model. As can be seen, the pattern of significant relationships confirms our predictions. Only the significant path from perceived pride to relevant voice expectation was not part of our original prediction.

As we noted in our "Method" section, social identification was measured *after* voice desires and expectations, and yet we include it currently as a predictor. We, thus, examined an alternative model that reversed the social identification, and voice desires and expectations stages. Perceived respect and perceived pride continued to predict all four voice desires and expectations scales, but only these latter scales predicted social identification. This did not produce a good model fit, $\chi^2(17) = 75.54$, $p < .001$; GFI = .922; AGFI = .748; RMSEA = .150; PCLOSE = .000. This provides us with greater confidence in our hypothesized model.

Discussion

Study 2 provided a second opportunity for us to evaluate our hypothesis that variability in voice desires expectations and would be related to relative levels of relevant social identification. We, again, confirmed this hypothesis, not only conceptually replicating the results of Study 1, but extending our conclusions by being able to make causal inferences. Specifically, through novel pride and respect manipulations, we were able to influence *causally* perceptions of pride and respect, subsequent social identification and, ultimately, voice desires and expectations. Moreover, this pattern emerged only for *relevant* voice desires and expectations. Social identification was not significantly related to irrelevant voice desires and expectations in our causal model.



Fig. 1 Significant paths in the tested theoretical model. Values are standardized regression weights. *$p < .05$; **$p < .001$

A few additional patterns emerged in the data that are, of course, worth mentioning. First, the interaction between our pride and respect manipulations did not significantly predict perceptions of pride and respect. The two manipulations had independent effects on participants' relevant perceptions. Second, our pride manipulation did affect perceived respect, while our respect manipulation did affect perceived pride. These latter patterns are not overly unexpected, since receiving relatively negative feedback on one's performance (as in our low respect condition) is not likely to engender high pride in one's in-group. Importantly, stronger effects were observed on the relevant measures (i.e. manipulated pride with perceived pride, manipulated respect with perceived respect).

And third, perceived pride had a direct effect (as well as an indirect effect) on relevant voice expectations. Although unpredicted, this effect is interesting because, unlike Study 1, desires and expectations emerged as separate components in Study 2. By including them, then, as separate outcomes in our model, we have been able to observe that variability in each is, in fact, subject to slightly different psychological processes. Currently, we can only conjecture as to why pride, but not respect, affected relevant voice expectations—and why it was expectations, and not desires, that were affected. We suspect that, because voice was to be expressed *externally* to participants' group, they were using their group's relative intergroup status (through the pride manipulation), and *not* their personal intragroup status (through the respect manipulation), as a basis for giving them legitimacy in expressing the external relevant voice; this legitimacy, in turn, may well have led to an expectation of being provided voice (i.e. because their group had done so well relative to an out-group, they somehow deserved voice). On the other hand, *wanting* relevant voice may, in fact, be simply related to the degree to which one's self-concept strongly tied (through, in this case, higher levels of social identification) to the voice-related issues. Thus, much in the same way that people who self-categorize along attitude-related issues are more likely actually to engage in self-category related behaviours than those who do not (Musgrove & McGarty, 2008), so too will highly identified people desire to engage in a behaviour (in this case, voice) directly associated with their context-relevant self-definitions.

General Discussion

We began this paper by reviewing research and theory in procedural justice, noting an implicit assumption in this literature of relatively high levels of desires to have one's say (i.e. desires for voice). We then noted that this assumption, precisely because of its implicit nature, has received little to no conceptual attention, and effectively no empirical examination. Nevertheless, upon examining work in related social–psychological domains, we hypothesized that relative levels of social identification with an in-group would predict variability in voice desires, and even expectations, in social-identity-relevant domains. We evaluated this hypothesis in two studies with both enduring and laboratory-created groups. Both studies provided clear support for the hypothesis. The more people identified with a social group, the more they desired and expected voice in matters relevant to their group

membership. The implications of these findings bear directly upon interpretations of extant social justice research: typical voice effects, in which relatively positive consequences emerge from voice provision, should not be interpreted as representing uniformly high desires for voice. We will examine these implications below, starting with a decomposition of three important features of our hypothesis.

First, our hypothesis proposes *variability* in voice desires and expectations. This is conceptually important because the overwhelming body of evidence within the procedural justice literature points to an almost uniformly positive set of consequences of voice provision to both individuals and group members. This, of course, we do not contest, as we have contributed to this work ourselves (e.g. Huo, Binning, & Molina, 2010; Platow et al., 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2001). Instead, we question simply the logic of inferring from these known positive consequences a broad and uniform state of desire and expectation for voice. Clearly such uniformity was not observed in the current research. Notably, voice desire and expectation ratings ranged across the *entire* response scale in both studies. So, there is no question that variability in voice desires and expectations exists. Second, this variability implies that, at least under some circumstances, voice desires and expectations are not necessarily *high*. Indeed, some individual participants expressed extremely low levels of desires for, and expectations of, voice. Moreover, mean-level differences were also observed. Relevant voice desires in Study 2, for example, were significantly greater than indifference, but irrelevant voice desires were not; expectations in both cases were significantly *lower* than indifference.

These findings highlight the importance of the third attribute of our hypothesis, that social identification predicts only *relevant* voice desires and expectations. As we observed in the evaluation of our hypothesis, it was only relevant voice that was related to social identification in both studies. But beyond the correlations, however, relevance clearly played an important role by affecting mean levels of voice desires and expectations. Relevance, thus, is a key conceptual variable that must be considered when evaluating both the antecedents and consequences of voice. Of course, we must remain cautious against reifying the concept of relevance. Voice domains are not simply relevant or irrelevant. Rather, relevance itself will vary with variability in people's salient psychological group memberships. So, for example, voice associated with healthcare initiatives in Study 2 was operationalized as irrelevant, but only so because the salient self-category was that of creativity-based, small, and interactive online groups. Had the salient self-category been one of, say, Australian national identity—or, better yet, one of patient advocacy groups—then healthcare initiative-associated voice would, of course, have become relevant.

The results of Study 2 also highlight a separate conceptual and empirical domain that will benefit in the future from further development. This is, specifically, the difference between desires and expectations. Although we noted in the "Introduction" that these are, in fact, conceptually different (e.g. McDaniel, 1970), our current methods were not designed to disentangle any potential empirical difference. In the end, however, desires represent relative longings or preferences, while expectations are likely to be associated with implicit probability judgements of future events. Although participants' responses on desires and expectations items formed a single empirical component in Study 1, in Study 2 they were separable.

Recognizing this separability led us to make two different observations within our data. First, participants' voice desires were always greater than their voice expectations. This pattern is consistent with the view that voice desires are, at least, *relatively* high.

Second, we observed a direct path from perceived pride to relevant voice expectations. So while expectations were clearly outcomes of relative levels of social identification, they are also differentially related to other psychological processes. Our post hoc reasoning regarding the pride–expectation relationship focused on people's potential views about the legitimacy of being provided with voice. In determining some sort of probably of being asked their opinions, people are likely to consider a range of factors that would form a legitimate basis for the request. One basis might be the relatively high performance of a group one is representing in an intergroup context, not unlike the situation observed in Study 2. This relative performance may not only be a basis for pride, but may be an indicator of relative status. Of course, group-based status characteristics reliably predict people's *actual* voice behaviour (e.g. Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keeting, 1988). Moreover, one's *personal* status within a group context might also reasonably be related to one's personal expectations of voice provision. Higher-status persons, such as leaders or relatively in-group prototypical in-group members, may well expect to be provided with voice more so than those with relatively lower levels of status (cf., Reid & Ng, 2000). We suggest, then, that future work in this area examines not only relative levels of in-group social identification, but relative levels of individual and group status as a possible means for differentiating between voice desires and voice expectations.

Finally, the current data have important implications for our understanding of the social psychology of procedural justice per se. Once again, voice is neither unitarily desired nor expected among group members. Clearly, then, one of the next empirical questions to be asked is whether the typically observed positive consequences of voice provision still obtain when voice is provided, *but not wanted*. It is not hard to imagine that being thrust with a voice opportunity—or worse, a voice demand—could potentially lead to responses such as frustration and anger if that voice opportunity is unwanted. In fact, if the voice provider offers voice in full knowledge of the recipient's desire *not* to have it, then this clear lack of recognition of the recipient's preferences could easily lead to a *reduction* in perceived respect. In this manner, respect is not afforded by the provision of voice in and of itself; instead, it is afforded through the recognition of, and deference to, the recipient's wishes. Whether this would also lead to relatively lower levels of perceived fairness remains an open question.

A second direction of social justice research and theory emerging from the current analysis would be to consider what *alternative* procedural justice principles are likely to be valued instead of voice (cf., Lind, Huo, & Tyler, 1994). In contexts characterized by status differences, for example, lower-status individuals or groups might demand voice precisely for its instrumental properties. At the same time, higher-status individuals and groups—particularly *legitimately* higher-status individuals and groups—may feel sufficiently confident in their positions that they would be willing to forgo voice (i.e. express a relatively low desire for voice) in

favour of alternative rules such as unbiased decision-making, *precisely because the unbiased decision maker ought to recognize their legitimately higher status and afford them the material benefits normatively associated with it*. Some evidence consistent with this reasoning has previously been observed in intergroup relations among relatively high-status non-Indigenous Australians and lower-status Indigenous Australians (Peate et al., 2008).

Conclusion

Within the social–psychological literature on procedural justice, a large body of work has been dedicated to examining the relative importance of voice. Through both the provision and denial of voice, a range of personal and social consequences of have been observed. These consequences point, quite conclusively, to the *positive* value of voice provision—people feel better about themselves and are more committed to their groups when provided, rather than denied, voice in matters relevant to them. The structure of this work has, thus, been one in which voice provision and denial have effectively served as independent variables (Brockner & Carter, 2014). This has meant, however, that researchers have not considered whether, and the degree to which, individuals and group members actually want voice in the first instance. This is both a conceptual and empirical concern because the unquestionably positive consequences of voice provision may inadvertently lead readers to assume a relatively high and uniform level of voice desires, and even expectations, in the first instance. Currently, we questioned this (unstated) assumption, directly measured people's desires and expectations for voice, and hypothesized that any variability we may observe in these would be predicted by people's relative levels of social identification with their voice content-relevant in-group. Our hypothesis was confirmed in two studies. While people do desire and expect voice, these are, again, neither necessarily extreme nor uniform. Moreover, variability in these desires and expectations is associated in a systematic manner with the relative levels of social identification related to a salient in-group that is relevant to the voice context.

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Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Ethical Standard All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Ethical permission to conduct this research was provided by the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee.

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