This article examines attention to justice cues in the novel context of the nascent democracy of Tanzania. Using secondary national survey data, we illustrate Tanzanian citizens’ attention to justice cues. We then test two competing hypotheses about the impact of religious identity on attention to justice cues. The first hypothesized model, based on System Justification Theory, predicts that subordinate group members (Muslims) will stay more loyal than dominant group members (Christians) to their government due to a decreased attention to justice cues. The second hypothesized model, based on the relational model of procedural justice, predicts that subordinate group members (Muslims) will dissent more than dominant group members (Christians) from their government due to an increased attention to justice cues. Multiple regression and mediational analyses indicate support for the procedural justice framework, with trust in the dominant political party mediating the relationship between process satisfaction and party identification. Implications for political and psychological theorizing about democratic processes will be discussed.

KEY WORDS: procedural justice, System Justification Theory, social identity, democracy, religion

What does it mean to be “ready for democracy?” As democracy spreads throughout the world, some have argued that certain countries are simply “not ready for democracy” (cf. Carothers, 1997; Kurzman, 1998). The underlying assumption in this argument is that citizens in nascent political systems have not yet developed a preference for fairness over despotism, and consequently, their voting decisions, political identities, and endorsement of political systems reflect a preference for self-interest above all else (Bratton, 2008). Conversely, other scholars have described the need for justice and equity as an implicit and fundamental human desire that renders a drive for justice ever-present (Deutsch, 1975; Lerner & Clayton, 2011). Neither of these suppositions, however, has ever been tested in the context of a newly formed democracy.
The nascent democracy of interest in this article, Tanzania, has been a democracy for less than 20 years and is situated in a region particularly rife with violations of justice. This article will investigate not only if the need for justice is present among Tanzanian citizens but will also pinpoint which segments of society are most attentive to it. Specifically, we will determine whether there are intergroup differences in constituents’ “taste” for justice. The two models used to explore these potential intergroup differences are (1) system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and (2) the relational model posited within the procedural justice literature (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Both system justification and the relational model highlight the importance of group identity in attention to justice cues. They make contrasting predictions, however, about whether the minority group in society will pay less (system justification) or more (group engagement) attention to justice cues, and how these cues will impact their support for political authority. This article will pit these two predictions against each other in the novel context of Tanzania.

**Social Identity in Tanzania**

The most common choice, when studying the impact of social identity, is to focus on racial or ethnic identity. Indeed, the impact of racial identity has been highlighted in both the system justification literature (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003) and the procedural justice literature (Huo, 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Tyler, Lind, Ohbuchi, Sugawara, & Huo, 1998). In Tanzania, however, there is a strong superordinate ethnic “Tanzanian” identity that stems from the nation’s socialist history (cf. Meredith, 2005). In the 1960s a policy of “ujamaa” (Swahili for “family” or “togetherness”) was enacted. Ujamaa utilized forced relocation of Tanzanians onto collective, government farms, with the aim of creating one Tanzanian “family” that would blend together the hundreds of different ethnic groups present in the country. Although ujamaa was often brutal, it was effective at blurring ethnic subgroup identification and creating a strong and lasting identification with being Tanzanian. Thus, Tanzania has remained relatively protected from ethnic/racial strife.

Ethnic identity, however, is not the only potentially divisive political wedge in Tanzania. In Tanzania, the salient religious divide is between Christians and Muslims, with a population that is 60% Christian, 36% Muslim, 2% traditional African religions, and 1% unaffiliated (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2011). Thus, Muslims are the minority in the Tanzanian context. This is especially true in a political sense, since the dominant political party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) are largely Christian (Mushi, Mukandala, & Baregu, 2001). Consequently, although Tanzania remains relatively free from racial politics, religious identity is still a potential source of conflict.

Past research in a variety of cultural contexts has shown that religious identification can often lead to intergroup conflict and outgroup derogation (Wellman & Tokuno, 2004). This phenomenon has been studied in a variety of conflict contexts that are political in nature, such as Protestants and Catholics in Ireland (Eriksen, 2001) and Hindus, Muslims, and Christians in India (Rao, 1999). Salience of religious identity has been shown to increase in a sociopolitical climate that is violent or uncertain and somehow referent of religious identity (Moskalenko, McCauley, & Rozin, 2006). This has strong implications for Tanzania given that it is located in East Africa where every other country in the region (Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan) has experienced civil war or large-scale violence in the past 30 years—many in the early stages of their own democracies. The study offers a contribution to the literature on religious identity given that it has not been studied in the context of justice concerns.

Given past research, system justification theory and the relational model would seem to predict contrasting impacts of minority (Muslim) identity on political attitudes. System justification suggests that people want to feel positively about their group, but primarily about the “system” (often the political context) in general (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Thus, system justification theory argues that it
is the low-status constituents (e.g., those with low education, low income, non-Whites, etc.) who are often less critical of government, more willing to disregard and overlook the infringement of justice, and more likely to support the status quo (Jost et al., 2003). Ignoring these justice cues allows minority groups to resolve any dissonance about their disadvantaged position in society (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).

The relational model, on the other hand, suggests that attention to justice may be higher among those who have the most marginalized social identity or most precarious social standing (Smith & Tyler, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). This is due to the fact that fair procedures are important signals of inclusion in and respect from the larger group or society (Huo, Binning, & Molina, 2010a; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996). Whereas the relational model describes the experience of an individual’s standing within a group, related research has found evidence that minority group members in society are particularly attuned to fairness cues and its implication for their social standing (Huo, Binning, & Molina, 2010b; Huo & Molina, 2006; Huo, Molina, Binning, & Funge, 2010). This body of work as a whole suggests that low-status constituents are more likely to use process information in formulating support for authorities (Tyler & Lind, 1990). Attending to these justice cues resolves any uncertainty about a minority group’s standing in the larger society.

**Justice Cues**

One of the most frequently used indicators of justice is process satisfaction (cf. Tyler & Lind, 1992), particularly in the political domain (Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985). Process satisfaction refers to how satisfied one is with the process by which an authority figure reaches a decision (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Past research has shown that greater satisfaction with the processes underlying one’s treatment by an authority figure would lead to greater support and more positive evaluations of that authority figure, regardless of one’s personal gains (Smith et al., 1998; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996). For example, emphasizing a concern with process satisfaction would lead to the prediction that a voter’s support of a political party would be influenced by that voter’s satisfaction with how that political party appoints a cabinet minister rather than, for instance, whether or not they personally approve of the appointed cabinet minister. Conversely, dissatisfaction with the processes of a given political party will lead to opposition to, and negative evaluations of, that party (Smith & Tyler, 1996; Tyler & Caine, 1981).

In addition to testing competing system justification and procedural justice hypotheses about the value of fairness in a new democracy, this article will also attempt to disambiguate the impact of satisfaction with different types of processes on support for political authority. Specifically, in the context of Tanzania, we are interested in evaluations of processes that involve intergroup conflict between Muslims and Christians versus those that are more general political processes that may be unrelated to intergroup differences. Thus, when we refer to “integroup” processes in the remainder of this article, we mean processes that specifically evoke the social (religious) identity of Tanzanian citizens.

There are two reasons that we believe that concern for intergroup processes will trump more generalized concerns in predicting support for political authority. First, in Tanzania, the threat of intergroup conflict erupting into war and violence is not an idle one but a concern born of salient examples. Extensive news coverage of violence erupting worldwide and in surrounding countries may amplify the salience and threat of intergroup conflict (Potter, 1999; Slone, 2000). Additionally, a sizable number of Tanzanian citizens are former refugees from these border counties. In 2008, there were nearly 433,000 refugees living in Tanzania (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). For these individuals, the threat of violence and instability is real and salient. Thus, for
Muslims (the minority group), we expect general process satisfaction and intergroup process satisfaction to predict party identification. However, we expect the relationship of intergroup process satisfaction will be a stronger predictor than general process satisfaction.

Trust in Authority

Past research has shown that trust of authorities and the organizational institutions they represent is closely linked to the perception that an authority attempts to treat all subordinates fairly—it is, essentially, a vote of confidence in the purity of the authority’s motives (Tyler & Degoey, 1996; Tyler, Boeckman, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, evaluations of process variables contribute to the formulation of trust judgments (Tyler et al., 1997), and trust, in turn, has been shown to predict support for authority (cf. Tyler, 2001; Tyler & Huo, 2002). We may also see intergroup differences in levels of trust of authority. System justification theory would suggest that the minority group (Muslims) would be more trusting of the authority as it is representative of the status quo (Jost et al., 2003). The relational model, on the other hand, posits that the formulation of trust and support often requires that one consider a leader as part of one’s ingroup (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Tyler et al., 1998). Given that CCM is largely made up of Christian politicians, this may impact Muslim support for the political authority (Smith et al., 1998; Tyler & Smith, 1999). Regardless of the valence of the intergroup differences, overall, we expect a mediational model where trust of authority mediates the relationship of process satisfaction to support for authority. Specifically, increased satisfaction with CCM processes should predict increased trust of CCM, which should in turn predict identification with CCM (as opposed to an opposition party).

The impact of trust on political party support should be particularly strong in the context of Tanzania for two reasons. First, trust has been shown to be powerful in formulating judgments of authorities in conditions where there is an expectation of a future relationship (Tyler et al., 1996). This is certainly germane for Tanzania, where the same political party, CCM, has maintained political control since independence from British rule in 1961 (Mushi et al., 2001). Democracy in Tanzania has technically been existent since 1995; however, no opposition party has ever been able to wrest political control of the country from CCM. Second, to choose political stability over self-interest requires a great deal of trust in the political authority on the part of constituents (Smith et al., 1998). This is certainly the case in Tanzania. For example, the ujamaa policy discussed previously was enacted by Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere. Ujamaa legalized the forcible displacement of Tanzanian citizens, set personal property on fire, “disappeared” dissenters, and ultimately brought about a famine the collapse of the national economy (cf. Meredith, 2005). Nevertheless, Nyerere is considered the father of Tanzanian democracy and an overwhelming majority of Tanzanian citizens continued to trust and support him as a leader of Tanzania for many decades. Historians have argued that this was due to the fact that he maintained peace and order among the diverse citizens of Tanzania, even though he may have wreaked economic havoc.

Study Overview

In accordance with past justice research, the present research tests two main predictions: (1) Muslims and Christians attend to justice cues at different levels. System justification theory would predict that the majority group’s (Christians) support (trust and identification) of CCM is more affected by justice cues (e.g., process satisfaction), while the relational model would predict that the minority group’s (Muslims) support (trust and identification) of CCM would be more affected. (2) Muslims and Christians attend to different kinds of process cues. Both system justification theory and the relational model would predict that intergroup process satisfaction would have a greater impact on the minority group’s (Muslims’) support for CCM. The former theory, however, would
predict a negative relationship (Muslims pay less attention), while the latter would predict a positive relationship (Muslims pay more attention). Due to the different patterns of results expected based on religious identity, we will test our mediation model for Christians and Muslims separately. We expect that the impact of process satisfaction (both general and intergroup) on party identification will be mediated by trust in government. Specifically, we hypothesize that greater satisfaction with CCM processes and higher trust in CCM will result in a higher likelihood of identification with CCM (as opposed to an opposition party).

Methods

Data. The data used in this study was from a multistage sample survey conducted in 2001 by Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET). The sample was culled from randomly selected districts taken from each of the 23 regions of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar (cf. Mushi et al., 2001). Participants within these districts were randomly selected and interviewed by REDET staff members in Swahili in order to control for differences in respondent literacy levels. All data was translated from Swahili into English for use in this analysis.

Participants. The sample contained 1,000 Tanzanian citizens. The sample was 50% female, and the average age of participants was 38 years old (SD = 12). Education level was relatively low, with roughly 60% of the sample having no more than a primary school education. Education level was coded categorically (1 = basic skills; 2 = primary; 3 = secondary; 4 = postsecondary; 5 = university) and entered as a control variable in our analyses.

Religious Identity. Muslims were oversampled for this dataset, providing a good basis for comparison between Muslims and Christians. In the sample, 51% identified themselves as Christian, 47% as Muslim, and 2% listed some other religion or were unidentified. Thus, religion was recoded as a dichotomous variable of Christian or Muslim, and the remaining 2% of religious affiliations were excluded from the analysis. Thus, our total sample analyzed consisted of 524 Christians and 468 Muslims.

Party identification. Political party identification was a free-response question, and thus identification with a party was optional. A total of 61% of the sample identified CCM as their primary political party, 16% reported being unidentified with a political party and 19% identified with an “opposition” party (a collapsed measure of membership in any of the other 18 registered opposition parties). Thus, party identification became an ordinal 3-point scale ranging from 0 to 1 (0 = opposition party, .5 = unidentified, 1 = CCM).

Trust. Trust in the current authority, CCM, was measured with one item, “How much do you trust CCM to keep the peace in Tanzania?” Responses were scored on a 3-point scale ranging from 0 to 1 (0 = badly/not at all, .5 = mediocre/somewhat, 1 = well/very much).

Process satisfaction. Process satisfaction was operationalized in two ways using Tyler & Lind’s (1992) list of procedural justice measures as a guide to ensure the items were in line with prior research. In order to examine general perceptions of process satisfaction, participants were asked how satisfied they felt (0 = dissatisfied, .5 = slightly satisfied, 1 = satisfied) about the process by which a new CCM vice president was replaced, a well-known political issue at the time. In order to tap into intergroup process satisfaction that would be tied to their social identity in particular, participants were also asked how satisfied they were with how the government handled the Muslim demonstrations (0 = dissatisfied, 1 = satisfied).

Control variable. System justification theory posits that education level also significantly impacts attention to justice (Jost et al., 2003). As identity politics are the focus of our interest here, this was not a main variable of interest; however, due to this precedent, education level was included as a control in all of our regression analyses. Education was coded categorically (0 = none, 1 = primary, 2 = secondary, 3 = postsecondary, 4 = university).
Results

Analysis. Relationships among variables were evaluated using bivariate correlations, independent sample t-tests, and linear regressions. Tests of significance for mediation analyses were conducted in SPSS using the “Mediate” Macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2013). This macro was used as it allows for the input of more than one independent variable “X” to be mediated as well as the inclusion of a covariate. The mediation effect can be interpreted as significant if zero is outside of the range of the confidence interval of the indirect effect posited. Given that we predicted differing patterns based on religious identity, we conducted all regression analyses separately for Muslims and Christians to ensure that any important differences in variable relationships would emerge.

Control variable. There were no significant differences in the level of education among Muslims versus Christians, $t (964) = .27, p = .79$. However, a higher level of education was related to a lower level of identification with CCM (the dominant party in power), $r (958) = -.26, p < .001$, as well as with less trust in CCM, $r (959) = -.21, p < .001$, and a less favorable assessment of general process satisfaction, $r (871) = -.09, p = .007$, and intergroup process satisfaction, $r (887) = -.09, p = .01$. This finding runs counter to system justification theory, which would predict that less educated people are more motivated to maintain the status quo. Instead, it suggests that those who are more educated may know more about how democracy and politics function and are likely to be more discontented with the status quo and CCM in general. This is similar to findings that indicate that political sophistication is a strong predictor of political decisions that deviate most noticeably from the political status quo (Sidanius, 1988).

Impact of religious identity. The initial impact of religious identity was assessed by examining mean differences between religious groups with independent samples t-tests. General process satisfaction was relatively high among both Christians ($M = .89, SD = .30$) and Muslims ($M = .85, SD = .34$), with the satisfaction of Christians only marginally higher than that of Muslims, as indicated by an independent samples t-test, $t (888) = -1.83, p = .07$. Satisfaction with the intergroup process item was also relatively high among Christians ($M = .85, SD = .36$), but significantly lower for Muslims ($M = .61, SD = .49$), $t (900) = -8.48, p < .001$. Christians’ trust of CCM ($M = .80, SD = .26$) was also higher than Muslims’ trust of CCM ($M = .69, SD = .33$), $t (981) = -6.02, p < .001$. Muslims ($M = .64, SD = .43$) were also less likely than Christians ($M = .78, SD = .35$) to identify with CCM as opposed to an opposition party, $t (974) = -5.50, p = .07$. The relatively high levels of satisfaction with government processes and trust of government among Muslims provides a degree of support for system justification theory, which would argue that marginalized groups support the status quo. However, the fact that Christians are more likely to be satisfied and trusting than Muslims would seem to violate system justification theory, as it posits that marginalized groups are more likely to dissent from the system, rather than support it. Regardless of which theory seems better suited to the data so far, it is clear that these basic group differences between Muslims and Christians warrant separate meditational analyses for each religious group.

Mediation for Christians. The results for the mediational analysis for Christians are displayed in Figure 1. Linear regression, controlling for education level, indicated that higher levels of general process satisfaction predicted both trust in CCM ($β = .48, p < .001$) and identification with CCM ($β = .22, p < .001$), while intergroup process satisfaction predicted neither trust in CCM ($β = .04, p = .40$) nor identification with CCM ($β = .03, p = .50$). This is consistent with the relational model, which would stipulate that the majority group is not as concerned about inclusion within society and thus not as attentive to such process cues. The aforementioned relationship of general process satisfaction to party identification was fully mediated by the addition of trust to the regression ($β = .04, p = .40$), which also predicted CCM party identification ($β = .39, p < .001$). That is, Christian Tanzanians who were more satisfied with a general CCM process were also more trusting of CCM and, consequently, more likely to be identified with CCM. The Mediate macro confirmed that
this meditational pathway was significant, with an effect size of .20 and a confidence interval ranging from .11 to .32.

Mediation for Muslims. The results for the mediational analysis for Muslims are displayed in Figure 2. Linear regression, controlling for education level, indicated that higher levels of general process satisfaction predicted both trust in CCM ($\beta = .41, p < .001$) and identification with CCM ($\beta = .25, p < .001$). Intergroup process satisfaction also predicted both trust in CCM ($\beta = .32, p < .001$) and identification with CCM ($\beta = .39, p < .001$). This is consistent with the relational model, which would stipulate that the minority group is particularly concerned about inclusion within a society and thus more vigilant than the majority group to such process cues. The relationship of general process satisfaction to party identification was fully mediated by the addition of trust to the regression ($\beta = .08, p = .07$), which also predicted CCM party identification ($\beta = .39, p < .001$). That is, Muslim Tanzanians who were more satisfied with a general CCM process were also more trusting of CCM and, consequently, more likely to be identified with CCM. The Mediate macro confirmed that this meditational pathway was significant, with an effect size of .21 and a confidence interval ranging from .14 to .31. The relationship of intergroup process satisfaction to party identification was partially mediated by the addition of trust to the regression ($\beta = .27, p < .001$), which also predicted CCM party identification ($\beta = .39, p < .001$). That is, Muslim Tanzanians who were more satisfied with the intergroup CCM process were also more trusting of CCM and, consequently, more likely to be identified with CCM. However, intergroup process satisfaction continued to contribute a unique amount of variance not accounted for by trust. The Mediate macro confirmed that this meditational pathway was significant, with an effect size of .11 and a confidence interval ranging from .05 to .12.
This again is consistent with the relational model, which stipulates that minority groups pay particular attention to information about their status in society.

**Discussion**

Some scholars have argued that countries “need to be ready” for democracy—that somehow new democracies need to develop a taste for the value system that accompanies democracy or that constituents need to be educated for the democratic process to function (Carothers, 1997; Kurzman, 1998). The present findings, however, indicate that the appreciation for justice cues among constituents of nascent democracies mirrors that of constituents of more developed democracies. Overall, our findings are consistent with the hypothesized mediational relationship among process satisfaction, trust, and political support for the context of a new and developing democracy. Namely, increased intergroup and general process satisfaction (but especially the former) engenders increased trust and political support among a social minority (Muslims), while for a majority group the impact of intergroup processes drops out. This suggests that different contexts may make different types of processes more important than others. Finally, our findings suggest the primacy of the relational model over system justification theory in understanding intergroup differences in support for political authority in the context of a nascent democracy. Specifically, in our study, the relational model correctly predicted that minority group members utilize justice cues more in their political support decisions. We speculate that this may be due to Muslims’ concern for inclusion in a society that is in danger of violent conflict if the majority lapses into violence. The backdrop of volatile intergroup conflict in East Africa drives the urgent need for continued peace that pervades the Tanzanian context. This ever-present fear, perhaps, renders infringements of justice harbingers of a broader threat and, thus, attention to these cues becomes even more vital.

**Limitations.** There are two principal limitations to our research—both of which are artifacts of secondary data analysis. First, our item responses were 3-point Likert scales, which engendered much less variance than psychological studies typically have at their disposal. However, given that Tanzanian citizens were largely unfamiliar with surveys and had low educational levels, increasing the number of points on the response scales might not have resulted in any meaningful variance. Research has shown that with populations who are not accustomed to being surveyed, having too many response choices actually introduces nonmeaningful, random noise into the data (Matell & Jacoby, 1971). Moreover, this constrained variance only strengthens the validity of our conclusions given that we found an effect despite the low variance of our items. Second, the process-satisfaction questions used in this study concern specific events, such as the appointment of a vice president or the Muslim demonstrations, rather than general attitudes about government performance. This is a result of using surveys that focused on germane political events, and future research would indeed benefit from also asking more general questions about process satisfaction. Although this is a limitation, there are also benefits to the present approach. Using questions that had real relevance to Tanzanian citizens at the time increases the validity of the present findings. Given the low education level of the constituents and their unfamiliarity with being surveyed, more general attitudinal questions may not have been as comprehensible and, as a result, produced less valid and reliable data.

**Implications.** Despite the limitations of the data set, this article has a variety of strengths that are sometimes absent from psychological research on political phenomena. First, it utilizes a large sample. Next, it taps into the psychological processes of an understudied segment of the world’s population. High costs, translation issues, and difficulty physically accessing the desired population often prevent research from being conducted in developing countries. As a result, there is almost no psychological literature on Tanzanians—or even East Africans or Africans more generally (see
Consequently, this research provides a glimpse into the psychology of a population that is rarely surveyed. Finally, this article provides a framework for future research to understand the social psychology in the rich and complex environment of nascent democracies. In that vein, this article lends a greater degree of generalizability to the theory of procedural justice; it demonstrates that concerns with justice are not merely a culturally bound, Western phenomenon. The patterns found were consistent with past research, despite the low educational levels of Tanzanian constituents and the markedly novel context of a developing democracy. Thus, although the data analyzed in this study is concerned with attitudes of Tanzanians, we believe that the relationships that emerge are not merely artifacts of the Tanzanian context but generalizable patterns to democracies in general—regardless of the cultural context. Moreover, the tumultuous backdrop of a nascent democracy is a fertile domain for future investigation of political attitudes as well as the study of the underlying social psychological processes at work. There is a pressing need in political psychology research to go beyond past correlational survey studies and conduct experiments in these novel contexts.

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