Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments

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T. R. Tyler and E. A. Lind (1992) identified 3 relational variables that make authoritative procedures seem fair: indications of status recognition, trust in benevolence, and neutrality in decision making. In Study 1, students from the United States, Germany, and Hong Kong recalled a conflict and reported their reactions. In Study 2, U.S. and Japanese students rated 3rd-party and dyadic procedures as ways of resolving a hypothetical dispute. In both studies, trust in benevolence correlated more strongly with procedural justice judgments in 3rd-party procedures. Study 2 showed stronger links between status recognition and procedural justice in the U.S. sample. In both studies, the relational variables appeared to mediate the effects of voice on procedural justice judgments. The results suggest that the basic processes posited in the theory generalize to dyadic conflict situations and across cultural contexts.

Twenty-five years ago the social psychological study of procedural justice judgments began with the discovery that different dispute resolution procedures engender quite different fairness judgments, regardless of the outcome of the dispute. John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, and their students found that disputing procedures that grant disputants the opportunity to express their views and argue their case are seen as fairer than procedures that deny disputants this opportunity, even when the procedure results in poor outcomes (Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974; see Thibaut & Walker, 1975, and Lind & Tyler, 1988, chap. 2). The finding took on particular importance when research showed that procedural justice judgments play a very substantial role in determining which procedures are preferred by disputants (Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974) and how satisfied the disputants are with the ultimate resolution of the conflict (Walker et al., 1974). Later research showed further evidence of the impact of procedural justice judgments by demonstrating that procedural justice judgments are major determinants of the acceptance of authority (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & Park, 1993; Tyler, 1989), support for social and political institutions (Lind et al., 1989), obedience to laws (Tyler, 1990), and acceptance of and obedience to negotiated and mediated agreements (Pruitt, Pierce, McGillicuddy, Welton, & Castrianno, 1993).

The studies presented here sought to extend our understanding of procedural justice in three ways. First, we tested whether empirical relationships that have been observed in the context of third-party dispute resolutions procedures, and that form the basis of much recent theorizing on the psychology of procedural justice, occur also in dyadic disputing procedures. Second, we tested whether the effects of voice, one of the principal theoretical constructs in early explanations of procedural justice phenomena (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978), are mediated by relational variables identified by more recent theoretical work (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Third, we tested the cross-cultural generality of procedural justice effects, using cross-national comparisons suggested by recent developments in cross-cultural social psychology.

A Relational Model of Justice

Lind and Tyler (1988) explained many procedural justice phenomena by proposing that people look to procedures for important information about their social identity. We argue that procedures will be seen as fair if they carry the message, expressly or symbolically, that one is a full-fledged member of the group or society mandating the procedures. Procedures are described as fair when they offer reassurance that the person will not be excluded from the group or relegated to second-class status, with accompanying diminution of social identity. Tyler (1989), in a field study of reactions to legal authority, operationalized three relational variables on the basis of these ideas and tested the general assertion of group-value theory.

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that relational variables are important antecedents of procedural justice judgments. His findings confirmed that relational variables do correlate highly with procedural justice judgments. Tyler and Lind (1992) used findings from the Tyler (1989) study and from other studies of authoritative decision making to develop a group-value based explanation of obedience to authorities.

In the Tyler and Lind (1992) chapter, the argument was made that people use their judgments of procedural justice as a subjective index of the quality of their relationship with authorities and the groups that empower the authorities (see also Lind, 1994, 1995). Because procedural fairness judgments are used as summary judgments about relationships with groups and authorities, it makes sense that fairness will be defined largely in relational terms. Authorities are often seen as representative of the entire group or society, and thus perceptions of one's relation to an authority are important indicators of one's relation to the entire group. The particular relational issues that people seem to consider most in making procedural justice judgments are (a) inferences about the authority's motivations, especially the authority's willingness to consider one's needs and to try to make fair decisions (which we term trust in benevolence), (b) feelings that the authority has treated the person with the dignity and respect appropriate for a full-fledged member of the group (status recognition), and (c) the belief that decisions are based on a full and open accurate assessment of the facts (neutrality).  

Procedural Context and Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments

From the outset, procedural justice research and theory has tended to focus on procedures that involve the intervention of a third party in a dispute, leaving largely unexplored how procedural justice phenomena work in dyadic dispute resolution procedures. The first Thibaut and Walker study (Walker et al., 1974) compared justice judgments in response to two procedures in which a judge had the power to impose a resolution on the disputants. Later studies, both in the original Thibaut and Walker project and in the work of other procedural justice researchers, have tended to focus on third-party procedures such as mediation and adjudication, with only occasional attention to dyadic dispute resolution procedures, such as negotiation or confrontation. Theories of procedural justice have tended also to focus on procedures that involve third parties in disputes or other authority figures (see, e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Recent research has shown, however, that people tend to prefer dyadic procedures in many situations and that negotiation and confrontation are far more frequently used approaches to dispute resolution than are third-party procedures such as mediation or adjudication (e.g., Hauer & Penrod, 1986; Lind, Huo, & Tyler, 1994). In addition it is clear from at least one recent study of procedural preferences (Lind et al., 1994) that procedural justice judgments are important in shaping preferences for procedures in dyadic dispute contexts. We know relatively little about the antecedents of procedural justice judgments in dyadic settings, however. To date there has been no study testing whether there are fundamental differences between third-party and dyadic procedures in how people generate procedural justice judgments.

The three relational variables mentioned above can be translated in a relatively straightforward fashion into judgments that might be made in dyadic disputing situations. Thus, just as one could look at the dignity and respect of treatment by an authority, so too could one look for dignified or respectful treatment by the opposing party to arrive at a judgment of status recognition. In much the same way that one could use indications that an authority was considering one's needs or trying to be fair, one could use an opponent's behavior to arrive at similar judgments about his or her trustworthiness. Although an opponent is almost by definition not neutral, still some of the components of the neutrality factor, especially the willingness to have the dispute resolved on the facts, rather than on personalities or biases, could be used to make judgments like those that go into evaluating an authority's neutrality.

It is certainly possible that context and situation might affect the importance accorded the various relational variables. Previous research has suggested that context and situation can alter the importance accorded to various procedural attributes (Tyler, 1988), and it is reasonable to suppose that such differences can occur with respect to the relational variables laid out in the Tyler and Lind (1992) theory. We can use some ideas from Lind and Tyler's (1988) original formulation of group-value theory to derive some hypotheses about differences in the importance of various relational variables as the context moves from third-party disputing procedures to dyadic disputing procedures. In particular, it was suggested there that those antecedents of procedural justice that are seen as being at risk will be more heavily weighted in deciding whether procedures are fair (Lind et al., 1993, p. 238).

Considering how the three relational variables might affect justice judgments in dyadic and third-party dispute procedures suggests some possible differences. When a third party is involved in a dispute as a mediator or arbitrator, there is a shift of power away from the original disputants toward the third party. This occurs because the third party typically joins an existing dispute for the express purpose of offering or imposing some resolution. If the arbitrator or mediator decides that a particular resolution is correct, the parties come under pressure to accept that resolution. Even in mediation, where each party has the nominal right to reject the outcome, if the mediator side with one disputant there are strong social pressures on the other disputant to accept the mediator's suggestions. If this line of reasoning is correct, it seems reasonable to suppose that the power differential might make people worry about arbitrary or malevolent actions on the part of the third party, giving rise to concerns about the trustworthiness of the third party. Thus, we would expect that trust would carry more weight in determining procedural fairness judgments in third-party procedures than in dyadic procedures. Third-party disputing procedures generally carry some assurance of neutrality, as long as the third party is trusted, while dyadic procedures do not, and we would expect people to worry more about neutrality in dyadic disputes. Thus,

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1 The terms used here differ somewhat from those used in our previous work, including the Tyler and Lind (1992) chapter. We have adopted the new terminology because we feel that trust in benevolence and status recognition convey the meaning of these two dimensions better than the old terms trustworthiness and standing.
we would expect judgments of neutrality to be accorded more importance in judging the fairness of procedures in dyadic disputes. Finally, when the disputing context involves no third party, only another disputant, a key concern might be about the survival of the relationship, because the dispute, if serious, might call into question whether the dyad is viable. We would therefore expect that perceptions of status recognition might be a more important variable in determining whether a dyadic procedure is seen as fair than in determining whether a third-party procedure is seen as fair.

On the basis of this reasoning, we expected that in judging the fairness of dispute procedures that did not involve third parties, people would place greater emphasis on status recognition and neutrality than would people judging the fairness of procedures that did use third parties. In contrast, judgments of the fairness of third party procedures should be more closely linked to trust in benevolence than is the case in judgments of procedures that do not involve third parties.

Voice and Relational Antecedents of Justice Judgments

As noted above, we were also concerned with testing the causal relationship between the relational variables identified in our own work and voice, a theoretical construct that figures largely in the work of Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) under the name process control. Voice effects were the first procedural justice effects to be discovered, and they are probably the most replicated finding in the area. Lind & Tyler (1988, pp. 236–237), suggested that some or all of the voice effect might be due to the group-value implications of voice, that being given the opportunity to voice one’s views enhances one’s feeling of inclusion and therefore promotes the sort of positive intragroup identity that leads to a belief that procedures are fair. If this is so, and if the three relational variables described above capture most of the substance of group-value judgments, then we would expect the relational variables to mediate the effect of perceptions of voice. We tested this mediation in two ways. In both of the studies reported in this article, we used multiple regression to test whether there existed a positive correlation between judgments of voice and judgments of procedural justice and whether the correlation could be accounted for by the three relational variables. If it were the case that a substantial positive correlation between voice and procedural justice remained after the three relational variables were included in the regression equation, we would have to conclude that voice acts on procedural justice in some way other than through its relational implications. In addition, in Study 2, we tested structural models that included direct causal links between voice and procedural fairness, comparing them to models that included only relational variable-mediated links between voice and procedural fairness.

Culture and the Relational Model

Some justice researchers (e.g., Kidder & Muller, 1991) have argued that the meaning of fairness and justice are culturally determined, so we were interested in testing whether the antecedents of fairness differed across different cultural contexts. There is only a very limited theoretical basis for predicting cultural differences in the weight accorded each of the relational variables, but some psychological analyses suggest culture-based differences in values and beliefs about how power and authority work, and these differences might affect how fairness is defined. Hofstede (1980) noted that cultures differ markedly in what he terms power distance, a dimension that taps variation in how severe hierarchical relations are. In a hierarchical society, where the functioning of many social relationships depends on one’s relation with various authorities, we would expect greater emphasis to be placed on trust in making procedural justice judgments. In contrast, in egalitarian societies, where the doctrine of individual rights is stressed, status recognition may be more important in defining fairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1990). The reasoning behind these predictions is similar to that which led us to predict greater concern with trust in third-party disputes: If power and position are very important to social relations, as might be the case in cultures high on the power–distance dimension, then people will worry more about whether others are benevolently disposed toward them. On the other hand, if people form groups without much concern for formalities and social background, and if movement from one group to another is easy, as might be the case in low power–distance cultures, then status recognition should be a matter of more concern, because it provides needed information about whether an individual is recognized as an in-group member. In either case, we predict that the relational variable that is the object of the greatest concern will be most highly correlated with procedural justice judgments.

Whether these predictions are correct or not, there is clear value in investigating the effects of culture. At the very least, replication of some of the basic findings in non-American contexts would increase our confidence that the phenomena under study are not limited to this country. And if we discover culture-based differences in how people define procedural justice, that would provide grist for the mill of theory on this topic.

In summary, the primary goal of this research was to test some variables that might affect the manifestation of relational justice phenomena. Specifically, we examined whether procedural context and culture alter the importance accorded to each of the relational antecedents of justice. We also tested the hypothesis that the voice effect can be accounted for by the effects of voice on the three relational variables.

Study 1

Study 1 examined the issues discussed above in the context of a study of real-world disputes reported by university students in the United States, Germany, and Hong Kong. Measures of status recognition, trust in benevolence, neutrality, voice, and procedural fairness were obtained to test the hypotheses outlined above. Prior research and theory (e.g., Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Triandis, 1995) has suggested that the ethnicity of the other party to the dispute might influence procedural fairness judgments. For this reason, and to cover a wide range of disputes, the studies included a manipulation of the ethnicity of the other person in the dispute (half of the participants were asked to recall disputes with someone of their own ethnic background and half were asked to recall disputes with someone of a different ethnic background). No hypotheses were advanced regarding the effects of this variable.
Method

Participants. The participants in Study 1 were 165 female and 144 male undergraduate students at the University of California, Berkeley; 113 female and 103 male undergraduate students at the University of Osaka, Japan; and 111 female and 93 male undergraduate students at the University of Hong Kong. Twenty additional participants participated in the study, but failed to complete all of the procedure-use items and were excluded from the analyses reported below. All of the participants participated either in response to a course requirement or for a modest payment.

Procedure. The materials were administered in written form. The materials were drafted in English and were translated to German and Chinese by native speakers of these languages. Difficulties in translation were resolved by consultation among the researchers and by using the English materials to use terms and phrases that were more readily translated. Back translation of the final materials showed no substantial differences in meaning of either the instructions or the measures.

The participants were asked to recall an interpersonal dispute that they had recently experienced. As noted above, half of the participants were asked to recall a dispute with someone from the same ethnic background as themselves; the remaining participants were asked to recall a dispute with someone from a different ethnic group.

In an effort to make the recalled disputes comparable across the ethnicity of the variations, we asked participants in all conditions to recall disputes with a person who was not an immediate family member or someone with whom they were romantically involved. The participants were asked to write a brief description of the incident in a space provided on the experimental questionnaire.

The instructions were modeled broadly on "bare-bones" dispute descriptions used in many of the original Thibaut and Walker studies (see, e.g., Lind, Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger, 1978; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). The specific instructions given in the same-ethnicity condition were as follows:

At this point we would like you to tell us about a real interpersonal dispute that you have recently experienced. Think about the last time that you had a dispute or argument with a person of your own ethnic background.

The conflict could be about many different things. Perhaps that dispute occurred because you felt that someone treated you rudely or insulted you in some way, and you thought he or she should apologize. Perhaps it occurred because you believed that the person owed you money, and should reimburse you. Sometimes disputes occur because someone has failed to keep a promise to you. Perhaps it occurred for some other reason.

The person with whom you had the dispute could either be someone who you know very well or someone who you may have just briefly interacted with. Try to think of an incident that did not involve your immediate family member (parents, siblings) or someone you were romantically involved with unless these are the only people of the same ethnic background you can recall having a conflict with.

Think about the last such dispute or argument that you remember having. The dispute could either be of a very serious nature or it could be of only minor importance. In the space below, briefly describe what happened.

To gather some data on the nature of the disputes that would form the target of the major analyses, we then asked the participants eight questions about the dispute and the relationship within which it occurred.

With this dispute in mind, the participants were asked to rate how much they had used each of seven disputing options. The descriptions of mediation and arbitration were modeled on descriptions used in previous procedural justice studies (e.g., LaTour, Houlden, Walker, & Thibault, 1976; Leung & Lind, 1986; Lind et al., 1978; Thibault et al., 1974). The disputing options were described as follows (the italicized identifying titles were not included in the descriptions):

Social power and influence. Used your social influence and power over the other person to try to get him or her to do what you wanted. This includes telling other people how you were harmed and how the other person acted unreasonably. It could also include trying to convince your friends to pressure the other person to do what you want.

Ignoring and avoiding. Ignored the situation and avoided contact with the other person. This involves trying to disregard what the other person said or did.

Giving in. Gave in to the other person's demands.

Persuasion. Tried to persuade the other person that you were right by using convincing arguments.

Negotiation. Negotiated with the other person to try to find a compromise that both of you would feel was acceptable.

Mediation. Sought the assistance of someone to give you advice about how to solve the problem, but who had no authority to make suggestions that either you or the other person would have to follow. This person could be a friend, a member of your family, a clergyman, a counselor, or anyone whose advice you value.

Arbitration. Sought the assistance of someone who had the authority to make decisions that you and the other person would be required to follow. This person could be a teacher, a judge, the principal of a school, a dean in a college, or anyone else whose job gives them some power to make binding decisions about other people's disputes.

After they had rated their use of each procedure (using 5-point Likert-type scales where 1 = not at all and 5 = a great deal), the participants answered a number of questions about the dispute and about the entire disputing process, including ratings on a number of scales related to perceptions of voice and each of the three relational variables. Included also were questions about the fairness of the disputing procedure and the process of resolving the conflict. All of these questions were Likert-type items with affirmative statements about the disputing experience (e.g., "The methods used to resolve the dispute were very fair") with 5-point response scales like those used for the ratings of the nature of the dispute; for these items, the endpoints of the scales were 1 = disagree and 5 = agree.

The participants then answered questions designed to assess their beliefs about proper hierarchy and power-distance. These questions allowed us to test the validity of our assumptions about inter-site differences in these beliefs.

Design. The study involved four between-subjects variables, one of which (ethnicity of the other disputant) was manipulated. The other three between-subjects variables were the gender and culture of the participant and reported use of third-party procedures in the recalled dispute. The culture variable depended, of course, on the site at which the data were collected and the gender variable is a characteristic of the participant. The procedure variable was determined by whether the participant's ratings showed greater use of mediation and arbitration than persuasion and negotiation (which were, for most participants, by far the most commonly used procedures). Seventy-four respondents reported using mediation and arbitration more than persuasion or negotiation; 637 respondents reported using the dyadic procedures more. Participants in the third-party procedure condition exhibited substantially higher scores on the use ratings for the mediation and arbitration procedures than did participants in the dyadic procedure condition (for the use of mediation measure, Ms = 3.56 and 1.90, respectively; for the
arbitration measure, $Ms = 2.51$ and 1.33, respectively). Moreover, participants in the dyadic procedure condition gave substantially higher use ratings for the dyadic procedures than did participants in the third-party procedure condition (for the use of persuasion measure, $Ms = 3.76$ and 2.20, respectively; for the use of negotiation measure, $Ms = 3.01$ and 1.81, respectively).

**Measures.** We measured six variables that are central to the issues discussed above: procedural fairness, perceived voice, trust in the benevolence of others involved in the procedure, perceived status recognition, perceived neutrality, and reported use of the procedures. Procedural fairness judgments were measured using the average rating on two 5-point Likert-type scales asking for agreement or disagreement with the statements ‘‘The methods used to resolve the dispute were very fair’’ and ‘‘The method used to resolve the dispute was equally fair to both sides.’’ Perceived voice was measured using two 5-point scales assessing agreement with the statements ‘‘I had a lot of opportunity to present my views about how the dispute should be resolved’’ and ‘‘My views were considered and taken into account.’’ Status recognition was measured using agreement ratings on statements reading ‘‘The dispute was resolved in dignified way’’ and ‘‘During the dispute, my rights as a person were protected.’’ Trust in benevolence was measured using the agreement ratings for the statements ‘‘What I wanted was considered in arriving at a solution’’ and ‘‘The other person tried to be fair to me.’’ Neutrality was measured with the average responses to the statements ‘‘The facts of the dispute were accurately represented’’ and ‘‘Relevant issues were brought into the open so that they can be resolved.’’ For all of these items, $1 = \text{disagree}$ and $5 = \text{agree}$. Procedure use was measured with 5-point scales asking how much each procedure or disputing option had been used in the recalled dispute ($1 = \text{not at all}, 5 = \text{a great deal}$).

To get a picture of the disputes being rated and to understand how the disputes might vary as a function of the variables under study, we asked for ratings of several aspects of the dispute each participant had in mind. We asked the participants to rate how close they were to the other person prior to the dispute, how well they knew the other person prior to the dispute, how much future interaction they expected with the other person, and whether the dispute involved a broken promise. All of the items were assessed using 5-point, Likert-type scales, with affirmative statements (e.g., ‘‘Prior to the dispute, I felt very close to this person’’; $1 = \text{disagree}$ and $5 = \text{agree}$).

Because our predictions about the effects of culture were based on assumptions about how the three sites differ with respect to social hierarchy values and practices, we also asked the participants to respond to four items based on Hofstede’s (1980) description of his dimension of power–distance. These questions asked the participants to rate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements: ‘‘It is best for our society to let the elites decide what is good for us,’’ ‘‘Conflicts among people is minimized if everyone has equal rights in society,’’ ‘‘If followers trust their leaders wholeheartedly, the group will be most successful,’’ ‘‘An organization is most successful if it is clear who is the leader and who is the follower.’’ As with most of the other ratings scales, all of these items asked for agreement ratings on a 5-point Likert-type scale ($1 = \text{disagree}; 5 = \text{agree}$). Responses to the four items did not correlate highly enough to combine them into a single scale, so we report below our findings with respect to each of the items.

**Results**

**Characteristics of cultures and disputes.** We conducted multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) to test for differences in the items describing the disputes and to test for power–distance differences among the three national groups. These analyses were done to test whether our assumptions about the cultural differences were correct and to provide a description of characteristics of the disputes that might be relevant to the interpretation of the findings.

A $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ MANOVA of the power–distance items showed a significant multivariate main effect for site, multivariate $F(8, 1428) = 22.11, p < .001$; and no other significant multivariate effect. Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) of the four items showed significant site effects on agreement with the statements about being considered and taking into account, $F(2, 716) = 93.53, p < .001$; about equal rights minimizing conflict, $F(2, 716) = 7.50, p < .001$; and about the value of followers trusting leaders, $F(2, 716) = 8.97, p < .001$. Scheffé tests on the ‘‘elites’’ and ‘‘trust’’ items suggest that the German participants were least in favor of hierarchical social relations, the American participants were in the middle, and the Chinese participants were most in favor of hierarchical relations. However, responses to the second item suggest that the Chinese participants also believed that equal rights should be maintained in the face of hierarchy.

Inspection of the frequency distributions of the dispute description measures showed relatively flat distributions of dispute closeness, knowledge, and expected future interaction, suggesting that the instructions were successful in obtaining a good mix of disputing experiences. Most of the disputes (about 57%) were judged important; only about 25% of the disputants disagreed with the statement saying that the issues were important. The item asking about whether the dispute was completely resolved produced a relatively flat distribution. The most common cause of the disputes was rude or impolite behavior; disputes over money or broken promises were rarer.

A $2 \times 3 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ MANOVA of the ratings describing the disputes showed significant multivariate main effects for site, multivariate $F(16, 1320) = 3.56, p < .001$; ethnicity of other, multivariate $F(8, 659) = 3.35, p < .001$; and procedure, multivariate $F(8, 659) = 3.57, p < .001$. There were no significant interactions nor was there a significant gender effect. In general, the Chinese participants viewed their disputes as less important, but thought they were more successful at resolving them than did the American or the German participants. The American participants might be described as a bit more ‘‘touchy,’’ given that they reported that more of their disputes resulted from rude or impolite behavior, but it should be noted that rudeness was the principal cause of disputes in all three cultures. Cross-ethnic disputes were more likely to have arisen outside of close acquaintance relations, and the cross-ethnic disputes were viewed as more important. Third-party procedures were more likely to have been used in disputes that did not involve friends and in disputes over money.

We expected culture- and context-based differences in the frequency with which third-party procedures were used. The use of mediation is reported to be especially popular in Chinese cultures. We conducted an ANOVA on the total use ratings for mediation and arbitration. As expected, there was a significant site main effect, $F(2, 697) = 52.49, p < .001$: Scheffé tests ($p < .05$) showed that the Chinese participants used third-party
procedures more than did the American participants, who used them more than the German participants. None of the other main effects or interactions were significant.

ANOVAs. The major hypotheses to be tested in this study concerned the covariance structure between procedural fairness judgments and the potential antecedents of those judgments. To determine whether there were additional variables relating to the research design that needed to be included in regression analyses, we conducted 2 (gender) × 3 (site) × 2 (ethnicity of other) × 2 (procedure: third party vs. no third party) ANOVAs of the participants’ procedural fairness ratings. None of the main effects or interactions were significant.

Multiple regression analyses. Regression analyses are sensitive to differences in the reliability of measures, especially when tests of interactions are being conducted. Table 1 presents the simple correlation matrices for each culture, with Cronbach’s alpha on the diagonals.

As can be seen from the table, in most instances the reliability of the measures was similar across sites; the only exception was the relatively low reliability of our measure of neutrality in the Chinese sample. The low reliability for the neutrality measure in the Chinese sample probably resulted from differing beliefs about how various aspects of disputing go together. For the American and German participants, getting the facts out in the open and resolving the dispute on the basis of the facts seemed to be two aspects of the same thing. For the Chinese, who are generally thought to prefer indirect approaches to disputing, getting the facts out in the open might have seemed less clearly linked to getting an accurate, fact-based resolution of the dispute. Leung and Lind (1986) offered some findings congruent with this explanation. For the analyses reported below, we dropped the “facts in the open” item from the measure of neutrality, leaving only the “fact-based decision” item, which presumably does not differ much in its meaning from one site to the next.

We first regressed the procedural fairness judgments on the measures of trust in benevolence, status recognition, neutrality, and voice, as well as contrasts for procedure and site, to begin our examination of whether the effects of voice are mediated by the three relational variables.2 (Because site is a three-level nominal variable in this study, we created two dummy variables; the first compared the responses of the Chinese participants to the American and German participants, and the second compared the responses of the American participants to the German participants.) If the relational variables do indeed mediate the effects of voice, we would expect significant correlations between voice and procedural justice in each site, and we would expect the relationship to drop substantially when the relational variables are included in the regression equation. This is in fact what occurred: When variance accounted for by the relational variables is removed, the partial correlation of voice and procedural justice is only .10, considerably less than the .57 (p < .01) simple correlation between voice and perceived fairness. (Another possible explanation for a reduction of this sort is that the effects of voice might be obscured by more reliable, and highly correlated, measures of the relational variables. As can be seen from Table 1, however, voice was measured as reliably as any of the other predictor variables.) As can be seen from the first column in Table 2, the regression coefficient for voice, although quite modest, remains significant in the main effects analyses, but it drops to nonsignificance in the interaction effect analyses. As can be seen from the table, the relational variable of status recognition shows a strong regression coefficient, whereas neutrality shows a significant, but more modest, regression coefficient.

The next step in the analysis involved testing the contribution of interactions of culture and procedure with each of the four perceptual variables. For each group of two-way interactions (i.e., for all procedure interactions or all site interactions) we tested the increase in the $R^2$ when all of the interaction variables were added to an equation that contained the main effects and the variables for the other group of two-way interactions, an analysis procedure that is analogous to traditional ANOVA analyses with unequal cell $N$s. For the three-way interactions, we tested the increase in $R^2$ over and above a model with main effects and all two-way interactions. As can be seen from Table 2, the two-way interactions involving procedure did result in a significant increase in the $R^2$, $F(4, 688) = 2.73, p < .05$, but the test of the two-way interactions involving site was not

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2 We included contrasts for site and procedure, even though these variables did not show any effects in the ANOVA, because the main effects regression was the first step in a series of hierarchical regressions that also tested the hypothesized procedure and site differences in the relationship between procedural justice and status recognition, trust in benevolence, and neutrality.

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### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<td><strong>American</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Procedure fairness</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Status recognition</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neutrality</td>
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<td>.54</td>
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<td>.48</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.69</td>
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</table>

Note. Boldface values are Cronbach’s alphas; all other values are Pearson product–moment correlations. Values in brackets are alphas for the original two-item neutrality index; correlations for neutrality are based on a single-item index (see text for explanation). All correlations are statistically significant at the .01 level.
Table 2  
Hierarchical Regressions: Study 1

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<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Order of entry</th>
<th>Main effects only</th>
<th>Main effects + procedure interactions</th>
<th>Main effects + site interactions</th>
<th>Main effects + procedure interactions + site interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.33**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
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<td>.14*</td>
<td>.16*</td>
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<td>.30**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
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<tr>
<td>and German</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>∆R² site interactions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.009</td>
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<tr>
<td>∆R² three-way interactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Entries in table are standardized regression coefficients and squared multiple correlations. *
P < .05. **P < .01.

significant, F(8, 688) = 1.37, p < .20. The overall test of the three-way interactions was not significant (F < 1.0).

Inspection of the individual variable interactions with procedure shows that only the Trust × Procedure interaction was significant, F(1, 688) = 11.60, p < .01. Inspection of the bivariate correlations within each procedure condition shows that the Procedure × Trust interaction was in the hypothesized direction: The correlation of trust and procedural justice judgments was higher when third-party procedures were used (r = .73) than when dyadic procedures were used (r = .56). It should be noted, however, that even when dyadic procedures were used there was a moderate-to-strong correlation between procedural justice judgments and trust. (The reliability of the trust measure did not differ across the two procedure conditions: α = .69 for the dyadic procedure condition and α = .68 for the third-party condition.)

Discussion

The results of Study 1 provide some preliminary answers to two of the questions we seek to resolve. The substantial simple correlation between voice and procedural justice, together with the much smaller partial correlation when the effects of trust, status recognition, and neutrality are removed, suggests that the relational variables may well mediate much of the effect of voice. In addition, the observation of a significant Procedure × Trust interaction supports the prediction that third-party procedures engender greater concern for the trustworthiness of those involved.

But the results of Study 1 are not without ambiguity. One problem lies in the participants’ self-selection into the two procedural groups. Of course, nonexperimental studies nearly always pose problems of causal ambiguity, but we have the particular problem here that the major finding—the greater emphasis on trust in benevolence in third-party procedures—might be not so much a function of the procedure as a function of the type of participant who chooses third-party procedures or the type of dispute taken to third parties. Perhaps those who place greater emphasis on trust go looking for someone they can trust to resolve their disputes, and they then feel fairly or unfairly treated largely as a result of how well their expectations turn out to be justified. The differences we observed in the types of disputes recalled by participants who made substantial use of third-party procedures and those who did not raises the question of whether the Procedure × Trust interaction might have been due not to the hypothesized dynamics of fairness judgments but instead to differences in what actually occurred in the disputes.

Because we used self-defined groups on the procedure variable, we had very unequal numbers of participants in the two procedure conditions. This, coupled with our use of analysis techniques that corrected conservatively for the unequal cell frequencies on the procedure variable, means that our analyses may have missed some interactions involving that variable.
In addition, there was a significant regression coefficient for voice in the main effects analysis, suggesting that some of the voice effect might not be moderated by the relational variables, but the regression coefficient becomes nonsignificant in the interaction analyses, raising questions about how the findings on voice should be interpreted.

The findings with respect to culture are also ambiguous. We see clear indications on the power-distance items that the three sites did differ with respect to this dimension, but there was no significant interaction of any of the antecedent variables with site. Notwithstanding the sizable samples in the study, we are hesitant to accept the null hypothesis, and conclude that there were no differences. Further study, perhaps using different cultural contrasts, is clearly needed.

**Study 2**

To resolve these issues, and to have another look at possible cultural effects on the justice judgment process, we conducted a second study. Study 2 examined the hypotheses outlined earlier in a laboratory study of participants’ responses to a hypothetical dispute. All of the participants, who were American and Japanese undergraduate students, responded to both third-party and dyadic procedures, so participant self-selection was not a problem.

In Study 2, participants were given descriptions of hypothetical disputing situations that varied according to the relationship of the disputants, their similarity, and the nature of issues under dispute. The manipulations were included because they might represent dimensions relevant to the meaning of procedural justice, but we did not make any specific hypotheses about the nature of interactions involving these variables.

**Method**

**Participants.** The American participants were 130 female and 51 male undergraduate students at the University of California, Berkeley. The Japanese participants were 74 female and 90 male participants at Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan. As in Study 1, all of the participants participated in fulfillment of a course requirement or in return for a small monetary payment.

**Procedure.** The experimental materials consisted of a description of a hypothetical dispute, descriptions of various ways of handling the dispute, and a series of questions that asked the participants to rate, with respect to various dimensions, each of the methods of reacting to the dispute. The description of the dispute, which was modeled on dispute descriptions that have been used in a number of procedural justice studies (e.g., LaTour et al., 1976; Leung & Lind, 1986; Lind et al., 1994) and because they offer a nice comparison to mediation and arbitration. Like arbitration, persuasion involves convincing someone else that one’s views are correct, and, like mediation, negotiation generally involves compromise outcomes. The “social influence,” “ignore,” and “give in” options were not used much by the Study 1 participants, nor did the Study 2 participants rate these options as methods of dealing with the dispute that they were likely to use. This makes us wary of using ratings of these procedures to discover what people think constitute fair procedures.

After reading the descriptions of the disputing methods and procedures, the participants rated each method or procedure in terms of the two direct dyadic procedures (persuasion and negotiation) and the two third-party procedures (mediation and arbitration), because these four procedures are most directly relevant to the predictions advanced above. We restricted our attention to persuasion and negotiation among the procedures not using third parties because these two procedures are commonly used methods of resolving disputes (Lind, Hsu, & Tyler, 1994) and because they offer a nice comparison to mediation and arbitration. In the ANOVA and regression analyses reported below, the regression coefficient becomes nonsignificant in the interaction analyses, raising questions about how the findings on voice should be interpreted.

In the past tense.

In addition, there was a significant regression coefficient for voice in the main effects analysis, suggesting that some of the voice effect might not be moderated by the relational variables, but the regression coefficient becomes nonsignificant in the interaction analyses, raising questions about how the findings on voice should be interpreted.

The findings with respect to culture are also ambiguous. We see clear indications on the power-distance items that the three sites did differ with respect to this dimension, but there was no significant interaction of any of the antecedent variables with site. Notwithstanding the sizable samples in the study, we are hesitant to accept the null hypothesis, and conclude that there were no differences. Further study, perhaps using different cultural contrasts, is clearly needed.

In the distant-relatihip conditions, the other disputant was described as “a casual acquaintance” whom the participant did not know well and with whom the participant did not share many mutual friends. In the different-background conditions, the other disputant was said to have come from a different region and to have a different family background. In the insult conditions, the participants were asked to suppose that the other disputant had treated them rudely or insulted them in the course of a personal encounter.

After the participants read the description of the hypothetical dispute, they were asked to read descriptions of seven "ways of dealing with the dispute." The seven options were the same as those used in Study 1, and were described in virtually the same terms, with the exception that the descriptions were phrased in the present tense, rather than in the past tense. The analyses presented below use only the participants’ responses to the two direct dyadic procedures (persuasion and negotiation) and the two third-party procedures (mediation and arbitration), because these four procedures are most directly relevant to the predictions advanced above. We restricted our attention to persuasion and negotiation among the procedures not using third parties because these two procedures are commonly used methods of resolving disputes (Lind, Hsu, & Tyler, 1994) and because they offer a nice comparison to mediation and arbitration. Like arbitration, persuasion involves convincing someone else that one’s views are correct, and, like mediation, negotiation generally involves compromise outcomes. The “social influence,” “ignore,” and “give in” options were not used much by the Study 1 participants, nor did the Study 2 participants rate these options as methods of dealing with the dispute that they were likely to use. This makes us wary of using ratings of these procedures to discover what people think constitute fair procedures.

After reading the descriptions of the disputing methods and procedures, the participants rated each method or procedure in terms of the likelihood that they would use it to handle the hypothetical dispute. They then rated each method on a number of dimensions.

**Design.** The experimental design had three manipulated between-subjects variables (relationship, similarity of background, and issue), each with two levels, and two participant characteristic variables (culture and gender), each with two levels. In addition, the different procedures described in the experimental materials provided a within-subject manipulation (four disputing procedures: persuasion, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration). In the ANOVA and regression analyses reported below, we focused on a planned contrast comparing participants’ ratings of the two dyadic procedures (persuasion and negotiation) to their ratings of the two third-party procedures (mediation and arbitration).

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The materials for both studies are available from E. Allan Lind.
Measures. The procedural justice measure consisted of ratings, for each procedure, of whether the procedure was likely to be a “fair method for resolving the dispute,” using a 7-point rating scale with very unlikely and very likely as the low and high endpoints, respectively. The measures of voice and of the three relational variables were composed of one or two items each. For voice, we asked how likely it was, under each procedure, that the participant “would have an opportunity to present your views about how the problem should be handled” and how likely it was that the procedure “would allow your views to be considered and taken into account” (for both measures, 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). For status recognition, we asked whether the procedure “would allow you and the other person to resolve the conflict in a dignified way” (1 = very undignified, 7 = very dignified) and how well the procedure “would protect your rights as a person” (1 = very poorly, 7 = very well). For neutrality, we asked whether the procedure would ‘bring issues into the open so they can be settled’ and whether the “final outcome will accurately represent the facts in the dispute” (for both items, 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). For trust in benevolence, we asked whether “what you want will be considered in arriving at a solution” (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely).

The four items used in Study 1 to measure power–distance related beliefs were included in the questionnaires. The power–distance items used 5-point rating scales (1 = disagree, 5 = agree).

Results

Characteristics of cultures. As in Study 1, we conducted some preliminary analyses to determine whether the power–distance differences we hypothesized for the two sites were indeed present. We conducted a 2 (culture) × 2 (gender) MANOVA on the four belief items concerning the value of hierarchy or equality. The analysis showed a significant multivariate main effect for culture, $F(4, 337) = 13.11, p < .001$, and no other significant effects. The Japanese participants differed from the American participants on all four scales. The Japanese participants agreed more with the statement saying that elites should decide for society, univariate $F(1, 340) = 14.82, p < .001$ ($M_{[Japanese]} = 2.06, M_{[American]} = 1.57$), they agreed less with the statement that equality of rights minimizes conflict, univariate $F(1, 340) = 30.35, p < .001$ ($M_{[Japanese]} = 1.59, M_{[American]} = 2.47$), they agreed more with the statement that it is better for the group when people obey leaders wholeheartedly, univariate $F(1, 340) = 11.43, p < .01$ ($M_{[Japanese]} = 3.07, M_{[American]} = 2.52$), and they agreed more with the statement that clear distinctions between leaders and followers make for an effective organization, univariate $F(1, 340) = 7.63, p < .01$ ($M_{[Japanese]} = 3.44, M_{[American]} = 3.00$). Clearly the two samples did differ as we had hoped they would.

ANOVA. We conducted a 2 (culture) × 2 (gender) × 2 (relationship) × 2 (similarity) × 2 (issue) × 4 (procedure) repeated measures ANOVA on the procedural fairness measure. As noted above, the only element of the procedure effect that we examined was the planned contrast between the two dyadic procedures and the two third-party procedures. The ANOVA showed a significant procedure main effect, $F(1, 312) = 5.75, p < .02$, and a significant Culture × Gender interaction, $F(1, 312) = 9.39, p < .01$. The procedure main effect was due to higher fairness ratings for the dyadic than for the third-party procedures ($M_{[dyadic procedures]} = 5.05, M_{[third-party procedures]} = 4.71$). The Culture × Gender effect was due to a gender simple effect only within the American sample: Americans can women tended to see all of the procedures as fairer than did American men, $F(1, 340) = 4.18, p < .05$ ($M_{[women]} = 5.15, M_{[men]} = 4.85$), whereas Japanese men and women did not differ, $F(1, 340) = 1.14, n.s.$ We included contrasts for the significant main effect and interaction in the regression analyses that tested our major hypotheses.

Multiple regression analyses. We conducted a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses, similar in concept to those used in Study 1. In Study 2, however, each participant supplied four ratings of procedural fairness (one for each procedure) and four ratings of each of the perceptual antecedent variables (i.e., status recognition, neutrality, trust in benevolence, and voice). The analyses reported here correct for within-subject variance in the statistical tests by including participant number as a categorical variable in all analyses (see, e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 1975, pp. 403–425; Pedhazur, 1982, pp. 562–568).

Table 3 shows the zero-order correlation matrices for each culture, collapsing over procedure. For the measures that included more than one item, the reliability of the measure is shown on the diagonal of Table 3. As in Study 1, the only index that showed less than satisfactory reliability was the measure of neutrality, which showed relatively low reliability in the dataset for the Japanese participants. The problem, again as in Study 1, seemed likely to be the item about getting facts out in the open. We dropped that item from the index, leaving the index defined solely in terms of the item asking about whether the procedure would lead to fact-based decisions.

As in Study 1, the first step was to regress the fairness judgments on the four antecedent variables (and on contrasts for the within- and between-subjects effects seen in the ANOVA, as well as terms to reflect the variance attributable to multiple observations on the same participant) to see if voice showed a significant relationship with procedural fairness over and above anything that could be explained by the three relational variables. As can be seen from the first column of Table 4, voice did not show a significant link to procedural fairness when the relational variables were included in the equation, $F(1, 325) = 2.97, n.s.$ Given the moderate, and significant, simple correlation between voice and procedural justice ($r = .40, p < .01$) and the substantial reduction in the correlation when the relational variables are partialed out (partial $r = .03$), this provides some evidence that the relational variables might be mediating the voice effect. We return to this issue in the next section.

The second column of Table 4 shows the results of a test of the existence of procedure interactions; the increase in the $R^2$ when all four interaction terms (i.e., Procedure × Status Recognition, Neutrality, Trust, and Voice) are added is significant, $F(4, 320) = 9.86, p < .01$. The specific interactions that reach significance are the Procedure × Trust in Benevolence interaction, $F(1, 320) = 5.39, p < .05$, and the Procedure × Neutrality interaction, $F(1, 320) = 34.73, p < .01$. The form of the Trust × Procedure interaction is as predicted and as found in Study 1: The perception that those involved in the procedures could
be trusted to act benevolently was more strongly correlated with procedural justice judgments in the ratings of the third-party procedures \((r = .31)\) than in the ratings of the dyadic procedures \((r = .20)\). The form of the Neutrality \(\times\) Procedure interaction is as predicted: Perceptions of neutrality correlated more strongly with procedural justice judgments in the dyadic procedures \((r = .57)\) than in the third-party procedures \((r = .43)\).

The overall test of the site interactions was also significant, \(F(4, 320) = 11.12, p < .01\). Tests of the individual variables that comprise the overall interaction showed that only the Site \(\times\) Status Recognition interaction term was significant, \(F(1, 325) = 26.15, p < .01\). The American participants showed stronger correlations between their impressions of status recognition and their procedural justice judgments \((r = .66)\) than did the Japanese participants \((r = .35)\). The overall test of the Procedure \(\times\) Site \(\times\) Perceptual Variable interactions was not significant, \(F(4, 325) = 1.83, n.s.\)

### Structural equation analyses

The final step in the analysis of Study 2 was a series of latent variable regressions to examine further the possible mediation of voice by the relational variables. We first conducted an analysis of a model with procedure and site as exogenous variables; voice as an endogenous variable potentially affected by procedure and site; status recognition, neutrality, and trust in benevolence as endogenous variables potentially affected by voice, procedure, and site; and procedural justice judgments as an endogenous variable potentially affected by all of the other variables. The key question to determine whether the relational variables mediate voice is whether and when the analyses would show a direct link from voice to procedural justice. Table 5 shows the results of the analysis. The numbers in the table are standardized path coefficients.

The structural equation modeling yielded significant paths from site, \(t(345) = 6.75, p < .01\), and procedure, \(t(345) = -7.76, p < .01\), to voice; significant paths from site, \(t(345) = -2.64, p < .05\), and procedure, \(t(345) = 7.79, p < .01\), to neutrality; significant paths from voice to status recognition, \(t(345) = 10.15, p < .01\); neutrality, \(t(345) = 10.07, p < .01\);
Table 5

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<tr>
<th>Path from:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<td>-.10</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.12</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.87**</td>
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</table>

Note. Values in table are standardized path coefficients.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

and trust, r(345) = 12.59, p < .01; and significant paths from status recognition, r(345) = 2.47, p < .05, and neutrality, r(345) = 2.66, p < .05, to procedural justice. Most important, for the mediation question, there was no significant path from voice to procedural justice, r(345) = 0.64, n.s. When all of the nonsignificant paths, including all of the direct effects of voice, site, and procedure on procedural justice, were dropped and the model was reestimated, the fit with the data was quite good, x²(9, N = 325) = 12.41, p < .19, nonnormed fit index = .99.

We also, for the sake of completeness, estimated a model in which status recognition, neutrality, and trust were causally prior to voice. This analysis showed that two of the three relational variables—status recognition and neutrality—had significant direct effects on procedural justice judgments even though voice was included as a potential moderator, whereas voice did not show a significant effect on procedural justice. Analysis of a model eliminating any direct effect from the relational variables to procedural justice, but allowing indirect effects by means of voice yielded relatively poor fit with the data, x²(4, N = 325) = 62.51, p < .001; nonnormed fit index = .65, whereas analysis of a model eliminating the direct effect of voice, but allowing indirect effects of voice by means of the relational variables yielded relatively good fit with the data, x²(2, N = 325) = 0.43, p > .80; nonnormed fit index = 1.00. Clearly, the data are more consistent with the proposition that relational variables mediate voice than with the proposition that the perception of voice mediates the relational variables.

Discussion

The two studies just described show both some remarkable commonalities and some interesting differences in how procedural justice judgments are generated. Because it is natural to focus on differences, it is perhaps valuable to comment at the outset on what did not seem to differ much across studies, cultures, and procedures. In all four of the cultures, we examined the capacity of the three relational variables, taken as a group, to explain variance in procedural justice judgments. In spite of all of the error-enhancing features that inevitably accompany cross-cultural research (such as subtle changes in the meaning of instructions and questions, or cultural variations in how rating scales are used), the three relational variables together consistently explained much of the variance in the procedural justice ratings. It was by no means certain at the time we undertook this study that this would be the case. Given the sometimes substantial cross-cultural differences that social psychologists have reported in variables as important and as apparently fundamental as self-definition or attribution processes (see, e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Morris & Peng, 1994) and given hypotheses in the literature about how the very meaning of justice might change radically across cultures (e.g., Kidder & Muller, 1991), we had little reason to think a priori that the processes that drive procedural justice judgments were so robust across cultures. But in all four cultures, procedural fairness appeared to be defined largely in terms of the relational variables.

There was only one significant interaction involving culture: The American participants in Study 2 appear to have placed greater emphasis on status recognition than did the Japanese participants in that study. The direction of the effect is as we predicted, but the effect is far from overpowering (the Japanese participants also appeared to use status recognition to arrive at procedural fairness judgments) and by and large we would have to describe the culture effects in these studies as modest. One would not be far wrong, our data suggest, in concluding that procedural justice is defined in much the same way across widely different cultural contexts.

There is one argument that could be advanced against our conclusion, on the basis of the findings of these studies, that the impact of the relational variables seems to generalize across culture. All of the data reported above were collected using student participants, and one might argue that the students in our four sites actually shared much the same culture. One problem with this critique is seen in the significant differences on the power—distance measures found in both studies—their differences argue that the samples did differ in culture. Additional evidence that the participants at the various sites really did differ in culture was seen in some differences we observed on measures of cultural values that were included in the materials administered in both studies. We asked all of our participants to complete the Schwartz (1992) value survey, and we analyzed site differences on the 10 major subscales of the instrument. For Study 1, a significant and quite substantial multivariate site difference, F(20, 1432) = 50.83, p < .001, multivariate effect size = .415, was found, with significant univariate site differences on all 10 subscales. For Study 2, there also was a significant and substantial multivariate site difference, F(10, 330) = 15.05, p < .001, multivariate effect size = .313, with significant univariate site differences on 8 of the 10 subscales. It is always dangerous to put too much confidence in the absence of significant differences, and we certainly think there should be more investigation of cross-cultural differences in the justice judgment process, but it is worth noting that we failed to see much in the way of differences here, in spite of rather substantial value differences across the sites we studied.

We found greater differences in the antecedents of procedural justice judgments when the comparisons were across procedures than when the comparisons were across cultures, but it is worth pointing out that there is a good bit of "sameness" across procedures also. The variation we saw was not so radical as to suggest that the psychology of what is a fair procedure
changed radically as one moved from third-party procedures to dyadic procedures. There were changes in emphasis, but justice always appeared to be defined largely in relational terms. What changed was the relative weight accorded one relational element or another, not whether procedural justice correlated strongly with relational social perceptions.

We proffered some predictions about when specific relational variables would emerge as stronger or weaker predictors of procedural justice on the basis of the general notion that in generating fairness judgments, people attend to that about which they are most worried. Thus, we predicted that judgments of trust in benevolence would play a more powerful role when third parties were intervening in the disputes. Our reasoning was that the potential power of the third party would make people worry about whether they would be powered into something, and they would attend to, and make use of, information about benevolence. In dyadic disputes, we argued, status recognition and neutrality would be of great concern, so these variables would be weighted more heavily. The results of the studies were generally in line with the predictions—where differences were seen they were in the direction we had suggested. We made some predictions about cultural differences on the basis of similar reasoning, arguing that people in egalitarian cultures worry most about inclusion, and therefore attend to status recognition, whereas people in hierarchical societies worry about the abuse of power, and therefore attend to trust and neutrality. The evidence from the cultural comparisons was less striking than that from the procedural comparisons, but in the one instance where a cultural difference emerged, it was as predicted. Although we have little direct information from these two studies about whether the psychological processes we posit are correct, this is the second set of studies that has shown some support for predictions based on this line of reasoning (see Tyler & Lind, 1990), and it seems more and more likely that concern and attention effects play an important role in how people judge the fairness of procedures. If, as we have argued elsewhere (Lind, 1994, 1995; Tyler & Lind, 1992), procedural justice judgments are used as rough but ready evaluations of one's overall vulnerability in group settings, then it makes sense that people would try to incorporate information about potentially troubling factors into the justice judgment.

The procedural differences observed in these two studies have important practical implications. As we noted above, previous research on the psychology of procedural justice has focused on people's reactions to decisions reached by third parties. This focus flows from the original orientation of Thibaut and Walker's (1975) work toward understanding the psychology of third-party dispute resolution procedures, and the focus is a natural one in the study of interpersonal disputes, because the most difficult and intractable disputes typically end up in the hands of third parties. However, doing research and building theory only on the basis of authority relations ignores dyadic interactions, which are, in many realms of life, the most common form of social contact. Beyond the disputing context, nonauthoritative procedures are becoming increasingly important as businesses move away from hierarchical, bureaucratic, organizational structures toward networks and alliances (Limerick & Cunningham, 1993; Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992; Tichy, 1993). This change in the structure of organizations increases the importance of understanding procedures that govern decisions and disputes between equals (Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992).

The studies reported here addressed directly the question of how the social psychology of dyadic procedures differs from that of authoritative procedures. Our findings suggest that when people are engaged in dyadic conflict resolution, their procedural justice judgments are primarily shaped by assessments of status recognition and neutrality. However, when people deal with third parties and other authorities, their assessments of procedural justice are more strongly influenced by trust.

Recent organizational behavior research has shown a strong interest in trust as a central concern in social relationships (see Kramer & Tyler, 1996). This concern is evident in assertions that in equal-status networks "high levels of trust" will be crucial to effective cooperation (Limerick & Cunningham, 1993, pp. 95-96). Ironically, the findings of this study suggest that a decline in hierarchical relationships in favor of networks among equals may have the effect of diminishing, rather than increasing, the importance of trust. When people are dealing with superordinate authorities, as is the case in third-party dispute resolution procedures, for example, inferences about the benevolence of those authorities form a key antecedent to reactions to procedures. However, in conflicts without superordinate authority, trust may well be much less critical. Instead, if our results are to be believed, in dyadic decision-making procedures neutrality and mutual respect may be key determinants of whether equal-status structures are seen as fair and work well.

Another contribution of these studies is a resolution of a long-standing point of contention between older and newer trends in procedural justice research. The recent emphasis, in our own theories and in those of other scholars (e.g., Greenberg, 1990), on what might be termed the social cognitive antecedents of procedural justice—that is, beliefs and attitudes that seem to underlie the antecedents under study here, and that use experimental and artificial, method, and it added a fourth culture. There is certainly a need for studies that directly manipulate some or all of the antecedents under study here, and that use experimental design and careful causal modeling to tease apart further alternative causal sequences. But we would argue that the present studies put us well on our way to understanding the relationship between the voice effects that are so central historically in procedural justice and the more relational processes that are central to modern procedural justice theory.

The analyses that we reported above on relational mediation
of procedural justice judgments give us some interesting hints about why voice has, over years of study, proven to have such powerful effects on procedural justice. Recall that our structural equation analyses showed that voice affected all three of the relational variables. Voice seems to activate favorable relational judgments to a remarkable degree. In our original consideration of the group–value implications of voice (Lind & Tyler, 1988, pp. 236–237), we speculated that voice works to enhance one’s feeling of identity with and security within a group in two ways. First, the opportunity to speak gives one an opportunity to participate actively in the life of the group. If group membership is desirable, then this acting out of membership should make salient one’s identity as a group member and predispose one to accept the group’s procedures. Beyond this, the provision of voice is easily seen as a message from others that one is thought worthy enough to be listened to, and this in turn conveys the key “value to the group” message: Being listened to says that one’s membership in the group is valued by others.

The results of the studies point to issues deserving of attention in future thinking about how relational considerations work in justice judgments. Beyond the implications of the study for any single model, the findings have importance to the study of justice, and perhaps the study of group processes as a whole. Some social scientists seem to assume that behavior in groups is so basic processes than differences in kind. In the realm of procedural justice judgments there is a great deal more uniformity than difference. Even where differences occur, across cultures or across situations, they are more a question of degree or a question of slightly different manifestations of the same basic processes than differences in kind. In the realm of procedural justice, at least, our understanding of how people behave is, if not as complete as we might like, perhaps better than many fear.

References


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The Publications and Communications Board has opened nominations for the editorships of Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance (JEP:HPP), Journal of Counseling Psychology, and Clinician's Research Digest for the years 2000–2005. Charles R. Schuster, PhD, Thomas H. Carr, PhD, Clara E. Hill, PhD, and Douglas K. Snyder, PhD, respectively, are the incumbent editors.

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